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In my thesis, I will consider the topic of metaphysical modal claims. The
problem with metaphysical modal claims is that it is not entirely clear how
one goes about interpreting and assigning truth-values to some of them. It
shall be argued that a flexible, reductive account of the way in which speakers
issue and interpret modal claims would address this sense of confusion.
I will therefore motivate, develop and defend a reductive, linguistic er-
satzer account in a deliberately simplified language of modal predicate logic.
This account will construe possible worlds as maximal-consistent sets of sen-
tences, defining these structures in such a way that modal notions are not
employed. The idea of assumption-relative modal operators and accessibility
relations will then be defined, in order to accommodate the fact that most
modal claims do not concern broad logical possibility. Finally, a means of
incorporating essentialist claims into assumption-sets shall be developed, in
order to handle metaphysical modal claims in particular. An essentialist
predicate must be construed non-modally in order to avoid compromising
the reductive account.
The developed account will also be assessed. I will argue that it is indeed
reductive, that Lewis’s criticism of reductive linguistic ersatzer accounts do
not apply in this case, and that no other means of constructing possible
worlds has the potential to give a similar reductive account. However, the
commitment to a primitive essentialist predicate undermines the motivation
for the proposal qua reductive account. I will consider this objection, in
addition to others, and reiterate the theoretical benefits of the account.
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Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is to determine the meanings and truth-values
of metaphysical modal claims. By a modal claim I mean either a sentence
type or sentence token (that is, a type issued in a context) that contains a
modal term. A modal term is ‘any word or phrase that can be applied to a
given statement S to create a new statement that makes an assertion about
the mode of truth of S: about when, where or how S is true, or about the
circumstances under which S may be true.’1 Another way of characterising
modal terms is through noting the fact that their presence causes sentences
to make reference to ‘situations which need not be real’.2 Within the litera-
ture, different ‘flavours’ of modality are often identified. The most common
flavours include logical, analytic, deontic, epistemic, nomological and meta-
physical modal claims, with the latter variety being the topic of the current
dissertation. It is difficult to give a precise defintion of ‘metaphysial’ modal
claims. Examples of modal claims that are generally considered metaphysi-
cal may be given, however. This will serve to illustrate why there might be
questions about their meanings and truth-values.
Take the actual individual Adam, complete with a set of actual proper-
ties. Which of these properties could Adam have lacked, and which other
properties could he have possessed, whilst still remaining Adam? Could he
have had a different name?3 Could he have died a year later than he in fact
did?4 Could he have been created from different gametes?5 Could he have
possessed all of the properties that are possessed by another actual individ-
ual, Noah?6 Could he have been an angel, or a poached egg?7 These all
seem to be metaphysical modal questions, and to affirm or deny any one of
them would be to make a metaphysical modal claim. In addition, more gen-
eral claims such as ‘All humans necessarily derive from their actual gametes’
would seem to count as metaphysical modal claims. In short, a modal claim
seems ‘metaphysical’ by virtue of having an intuitively metaphysical subject
matter, though it is difficult to be precise about what this consists in.
The trouble with metaphysical modal claims such as these is that their









such claims true or false. The task, then, shall be to make sense of meta-
physical modal claims.
Some general aims relating to this task will be as follows: firstly, the
meanings and truth-values of metaphysical modal claims should be explained
within an account of non-metaphysial modal claims. One reason for this re-
quirement is that the meanings and truth-values of some non-metaphysical
modal claims seem as obscure as those of the metaphysical variety. Further-
more, categorising metaphysial modal claims and non-metaphysial modal
claims as ‘modal’ indicates that they share some common features, which in
turn suggests that a similar account of their meanings would be appropriate.
Secondly, the account should reflect the process by which speakers actually
issue and interpret modal claims. Thirdly, I shall aim to develop an account
of modal claims that is flexible, allowing it to be adapted to accommodate
diverse and sometimes conflicting philosophical perspectives. This will in-
volve my refraining from taking a position on matters that the account can
afford to remain neutral on. The flexibility of the account is intended to
maximize its appeal and utility.
As a first attempt at achieving this task, the language of modal predicate
logics shall be defined in §1.1. In §1.2, it will be found that translating
metaphysical modal claims into such a language fails to sufficiently clarify
their meanings and truth-values; though dealing with the deliberately sim-
plified language of modal predicate logic will turn out to be a useful means
to analyse metaphysical modal claims whilst avoiding paying attention to
the complexities of the syntax of natural languages. Having established that
more should be said about the nature of possible worlds than modal predi-
cate logic reveals, I will motivate a reductive account of metaphysical modal
claims. In §2.1, reductivism shall be contrasted with primitivism. Then, two
principles shall be discussed that seem to provide the best motivation for
modal reductivism, in §2.2-3. The next step will involve establishing exactly
what type of reductive account we should pursue. In §3.1, the different defi-
nitions of ‘possible world’ that are typically available will be listed. In §3.2,
it will be argued that only linguistic ersatzer accounts possess the potential
to be reductive. This brings us to the point at which a reductive, linguistic
ersatzer account needs to be provided. In §4.1, ‘possible world’ shall be de-
fined through making use of the non-modal terms ‘maximal’ and ‘consistent’.
An objection from Lewis towards this sort of approach will be considered in
§4.2. This will motivate the introduction of assumption-relative accessibilty
relations and modal operators in §4.3. In §4.4, it will be argued that this
linguistic ersatzer account is indeed reductive. A flexible, reductive account
has thus been provided; however, it is not obvious how to use it to interpret
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metaphysical modal claims. In order to extend the account to metaphysical
modal claims, I shall consider the implications of refraining from modifying
the current account in §5.1. Having noted that this approach fails, I shall
consider implementing the minimal modification of introducing constants
into the modal predicate language in §5.2. Yet in §5.3, it will be found that
the only way to accommodate metaphysical modal claims is to implement
the more significant modifictation of postulating that an essentialist pred-
icate appears in the assumption-sets for such claims. The traditional and
Finean views of essentialist predicates shall be discussed in §6.1. In §6.2 it
will be argued that, as Fine claims, modal terms cannot be employed to give
a reductive definition of this essentialist predicate; yet in §6.3 I will argue,
contra Fine, that an analysis of the essential predicate in terms of modal ex-
pressions will at least be materially-adequate. Then, in §6.4, I consider the
unwelcome consequnces of taking the essentialist predicate as a primitive,
and assess the implications for my account. §7 is reserved for addressing
several objections.
0.1 Modal Predicate Logics
In §1.1, I shall begin the task of making sense of metaphysical modal claims
by defining a class of modal predicate logics. In §1.2, the meanings of meta-
physical modal claims translated into a language of a modal predicate logic
shall be found to be clarified only to a limited degree by this translation
process. It will be concluded that the truth-conditions of modal expressions
must be further clarified, and the term ‘possible world’ defined, in order to
shed light on metaphysical modal claims.
0.1.1 Introduction to Modal Predicate Logics
A modal logic allows a formula to be assigned truth-values at multiple points
of evaluation, in addition to allowing the truth-values that a formula takes at
alternate points of evaluation to be specified at a single point of evaluation.
This contrasts with classical logics, in which fixed truth-values are assigned
to formulas relative to an interpretation. Modal logics therefore provide a
means to qualify the truth of a sentence, since a host of counter-factual
truth-values may be expressed for that sentence. The connection between
modal logics and modal claims should be clear, given that the latter were
said to pertain to situations which need not be real.
Modal logics will prove to be useful machinery in the investigation of
metaphysical modal claims, so must be characterised before they can rea-
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sonably be applied.8 The language of modal predicate logics consist of:
1. a finite set of individual variables
2. the standard predicate logic connectives ¬, ∧ and the quantifier ∃;
along with the identity sign =
3. a finite set of n-place predicate symbols
4. the unary modal operator ♦
One of the modal operators is here being taken as primitive within the
language of modal predicate logic, with the other being definable in terms of
it; that is, P = ¬♦¬P , and ♦P = ¬¬P , in accordance with Aristotle’s
Modal Square of Opposition. It is the modal operators that distinguish
modal predicate logic from standard predicate logic, with  normally being
interpreted as ‘it is necessary that...’ and ♦ normally interpreted as ‘it is
possible that...’.
The atomic formulas of a modal predicate logic language are of the form
P (x1...xn) or y = z, where x1...xn, y and z are individual variables and P
is an n-place predicate. The definition of the set of well-formed formulas of
modal predicate logic proceeds thus:
1. all atomic formulas are wffs
2. if φ, ψ are wffs, and α is an individual variable, then: ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ, ∃αφ
and ♦φ are also wffs
3. nothing else is a wff
It will be useful to isolate the non-modal component of such a language.
For a modal predicate logic language MPL′ consisting of certain variables,
predicates, connectives, quantifiers and modal operators, let a language
MPL′−,−♦ be MPL
′ without its modal operators. Then define the well-
formed formulas of MPL′−,−♦ in an identical way to the definition of wffs
for the language MPL′, except for omitting the clause concerning modal
operators. The set of wffs of MPL′−,−♦ will therefore be a proper subset
of the set of wffs of MPL′.
8The following is adapted from: Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998).
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Modal predicate logics contain every standard axiom of predicate logics.9
In addition, every modal predicate logic includes the K axiom (P → Q)→
(P → Q). A range of other axioms governing the behaviour of the
modal operators may also be included, and different systems of modal logic
result from the addition of different axioms. This completes the syntactic
characterisation of modal predicate logics.
In order to interpret modal logics, machinery developed in Kripke (1963)
is used. A Kripke frame for a modal predicate logic is a triple 〈W,R,D〉,
where W is a set of worlds, R is a binary relation on W and D is a set of
individuals. Each feature of a frame shall be discussed in turn.
W consists of what I earlier referred to as ‘points of evaluation’. How-
ever, these points of evaluation are often referred to as ‘possible worlds’ or
just ‘worlds’. This derives from Leibniz’s work on necessity and contingency,
which made use of the notion of the unactualized, merely possible worlds
that God could have created.10 The reason for construing of the points of
evaluation as worlds can be seen once it is realised that the classical logical
laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle hold within all normal modal
predicate logics. The law of non-contradiction is of the form ¬(P ∧ ¬P ),
and asserts that a wff cannot simultaneously hold and not hold. The law of
excluded middle is of the form (P ∨¬P ), and requires that a wff must either
hold or not hold. Conditions are therefore imposed such that every wff of a
modal predicate logic language must be either true or false, but not both true
and false, at each point of evaluation. Interpreting the points of evaluation
relative to which formulas are assigned truth-values as worlds is therefore
natural, due to the fact that each point represents a non-contradictory and
complete state of affairs (with respect to a language). It follows that, with
a rich enough language, both the actual world and a range of (logically
consistent) counter-factual worlds may be described within modal logic.
Without an accessibility relation R, the modal operators range over the
entire set of worlds W. This means that a claim is necessary if and only if it
holds at every world of W. The axioms 5 and T (♦P → ♦P and P → P ,
respectively) would therefore be valid on every frame, meaning that only
the system of modal logic S5 can be captured. Yet it was earlier mentioned
that different axioms may be adopted in order to generate different systems
of modal logic. The semantics of modal logic must be able to reflect these
diverse axioms if they are to provide an interpretation of the full range of
9These include the standard axiom schemata of propositional logic (see Kleene (2002)
pp.15-16) in addition to two axiom schemata governing the behaviour of the quantifiers
(Ibid. pp.94-5).
10For example, see: Leibniz (1985).
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modal logics. With the introduction of an accessibility relation, a ‘relative’
notion of possible worlds results, in which a particular world may or may
not be possible relative to another world.11 This is achieved by defining
different conditions on an accessibility relation (e.g. reflexivity, transitivity
etc.), which correspond to certain axioms (respectively, P → P , P →
P ) and result in semantics for distinct modal logics (respectively, T, K4).
If a world ∆ is accessible from Γ, then we write ΓR∆ or, alternatively,
〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ R.
The domain function D associates with each world the set of individuals
that exist at that world. The domain of the frame D(F ) = ∪{D(Γ)|Γ ∈W}.
〈W,R,D〉 is a constant domain frame if D(Γ) = D(∆) for all Γ,∆ ∈ W .
Otherwise, 〈W,R,D〉 is a varying domain frame. For a constant domain
frame, D(F ) = D(∆) for any ∆ ∈W ; whereas for a varying domain frame,
this cannot be guaranteed. In words, two sorts of frames may be defined:
ones for which there is a single domain for any model based on that frame,
and ones for which the set of individuals assigned to each world of a model
is permitted to vary. This completes the informal explanation of Kripke
frames.
As things currently stand, there is no way to interpret and assign truth-
values to formulas. A frame must therefore be extended into a Kripke model
〈F, l〉, where F is a Kripke frame and l is an interpretation function. The
interpretation function assigns to each n-place predicate P, and to each
world Γ ∈W , some relation on the domain D of the frame. In other words,
l gives the extension of every predicate relative to each world of a frame. In
addition, a valuation function is required, which is a function v that assigns
to each free variable x some member v(x) of D(F ) (for constant and varying
domains alike). If v and w are two valuations, then w is an x-variant of
v if and only if w and v agree on the assignments of all variables except
possibly x ; and w is an x-variant of v at Γ if and only if w is an x-variant of
v and w(x) ∈ Γ. The truth-conditions for modal predicate logics may now
be defined.
Given a model M, for each Γ ∈W and each valuation v :
1. M,Γ v P (x1...xn) ⇐⇒ 〈v(x1)...v(xn)〉 ∈ l(P,Γ)
2. M,Γ v (x = y) ⇐⇒ v(x) = v(y)
3. M,Γ v ¬φ ⇐⇒ M,Γ 1v φ
4. M,Γ v φ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M,Γ v φ and M,Γ v ψ
11Kripke (1963) p.70.
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5. M,Γ v (∃x)φ ⇐⇒ for some x -variant w of v at Γ,M,Γ w φ
6. M,Γ v ♦φ ⇐⇒ there is some ∆ ∈W : ΓR∆ and M,∆ v φ
The other connectives, quantifier and operator may now be seen as abbre-
viations as follows:
• M,Γ v φ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ M,Γ v ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
• M,Γ v φ→ ψ ⇐⇒ M,Γ v ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ)
• M,Γ v φ↔ ψ ⇐⇒ M,Γ v ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ ¬(¬φ ∧ ψ)
• M,Γ v (∀x)φ ⇐⇒ M,Γ v ¬(∃x)¬φ
• M,Γ v φ ⇐⇒ M,Γ v ¬♦¬φ
This completes the introduction to the syntax and semantics of first-order
modal predicate logics. It is important that such logics have been rigorously
defined, since the formal truth-conditions for the modal operators will later
act as a point of departure in determining the meaning of metaphysical
modal expressions in both logical and natural languages.
0.1.2 Modal Predicate Logics and Metaphysical Modal Claims
The current section will be concerned with applying the characterisation
of modal predicate logics from the previous section to the issue of meta-
physical modal claims. The aim will be to establish whether the formal
truth-conditions allow us to understand the meaning and determine the
truth-values of metaphysical modal claims as expressed in a modal predi-
cate logic language. It will be shown that, although certain metaphysical
claims may come out as true or false when translated into such a language,
this is only the case for the logical theorems of that system. Nevertheless,
attempting to understand metaphysical modal claims by dealing with their
modal predicate logic translations will turn out to be a useful approach.
Let us start with the metaphysical modal claim ‘There is at least one in-
dividual who is necessarily human’, and consider the modal predicate logic
translation (∃x)(Human(x)). The question we are seeking to answer is
whether the definition of modal predicate logics helps us to interpret and
assign a truth-value to such a claim. There are three ways in which the def-
inition of modal predicate logic helps us. Firstly, the logical truth-conditions
of a particular metaphysical claim can be given. For example:
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1. M,Γ v (∃x)(Human(x)) ⇐⇒ M,Γ v′ (Human(x)) for some
x-variant v′ of v at Γ
⇐⇒ for all ∆ ∈W, if ΓR∆ then M,∆ v′ (Human(x))
⇐⇒ v′(x) ∈ l(Human,∆)
Secondly, we may determine the logical implications of the truth of such a
metaphysical modal claim within all modal logics. For example, the inter-
definability of the modal operators yields the following:
2. M,Γ v (∃x)(Human(x)) ⇐⇒ M,Γ v (∃x)¬♦¬(Human(x))
Thirdly, we may determine the logical implications of the truth of the claim
within a particular system of modal logic. For example, if we assess the
metaphysical modal claim in a model based on a reflexive frame, then the
following is T-provable:
3. M,Γ v′ (Human(x)) ⇐⇒ M,Γ v′ (Human(x))
Results such as the three detailed above may demonstrate some collection
of metaphysical modal claims to be inconsistent in all or some modal log-
ics, in addition to giving the truth-conditions of metaphysical modal claims
expressed in a modal predicate logic language. However, modal predicate
logics have nothing to say about whether claims such as ‘There is at least
one individual who is necessarily human’ are actually true.
This is the case because the value of the claim ‘There is at least one
individual who is necessarily human’ depends crucially on the specification
of a model and a world of evaluation. No guidelines regarding the types
of models we should specify for translations of metaphysical modal claims
has been provided. Yet this has important implications for the process of
determining whether or not such claims are actually true. For example,
a suitable model to assign a truth-value to the metaphysical modal claim
could be set up as follows: let M = 〈W,R,D, l〉, where W = {w1, w2, w3},
R = (〈w1, w2〉, 〈w2, w3〉) and D(w1, w2, w3) = (a). Suppose l(Human,w2) =
l(Human,w3) = {a}; and l(Human,w1) = ∅. In words, we have a model
with three worlds, two of which contain one human, and one of which con-
tains one non-human. The claim (∃x)(Human(x)) is true at every world
of this model, meaning it is valid in this model. However, there are sev-
eral ways to alter the model that will result in the falsity of the claim at
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some world of the model. To illustrate this point, I shall introduce a mod-
ified version of M . Let M ′ be like M , except that R′ is reflexive. This
means that M ′, w1 1 (∃x)(Human(x)). The falsity of (∃x)(Human(x))
at some world may also be brought about by constructing further versions
of M where either the worlds of W are altered, the interpretation of the
predicate Human is changed or new domain-members are introduced.
In short, a modal predicate logic translation of a metaphysical claim can
only be true or false relative to a model that specifies the information from
which this truth-value is derived. But this means that the very information
that is at question (whether the actual world is such that there is at least one
individual who is necessarily human) must be specified before a translation
of this metaphysical claim can be assigned a truth-value! On reflection, this
is as things should be: for a logic that could answer metaphysical questions,
by presupposing certain metaphysical positions in its syntax or semantics,
would lose a great deal of the neutrality and flexibility that logical systems
are intended to instantiate.12 It appears that the purpose of working with
modal predicate logic translations of metaphysical modal claims is not to
automatically glean the meanings and truth-values of metaphysical claims,
but is instead the simplified syntax and semantics. For this reason, I will
continue to consider modal predicate logic translations rather than the nat-
ural language modal claims themselves.
Nevertheless, the lesson to be learned is that the task of making sense
of metaphysical modal claims is not completed merely by studying modal
predicate logic. It therefore seems that, in order to determine the meanings
and actual truth-values of metaphysical claims, we need to determine which
models the actual world can be part of. The aim of the remainder of the
thesis will thus be to clarify the modal predicate logic truth-conditions,
with the hope of reaching a point at which it is transparent whether or
not there are possible worlds in which the claim embedded under a modal
operator holds. A preliminary step towards this aim involves establishing
what exactly models and possible worlds are. This shall be considered in
the next section.
0.2 Motivating a Reductive Account of Modal Terms
Before an attempt is made at seeking a suitable clarification of the truth-
conditions for modal terms, the type of definition of ‘possible world’ we
require should be established. In §2.1, the difference between reductivist and
12Cocchiarella (1975) p.13.
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primitivist definitions of modal terms shall be explained. Two principles that
appear to motivate a reductivist account of modal terms shall be discussed
in §2.2, and in §2.3 the second principle shall be examined in more detail
and argued to serve as good motivation for modal reductivism.
0.2.1 Reductive and Primitive Definitions
The truth-conditions for modal predicate logic claims that were given in
§1.1 make use of the notion of possible worlds. Whilst the role of possible
worlds within Kripkean semantics has been described (they are the points at
which modal predicate logic wffs are assigned truth-values), a more robust
definition has not been given. We might expect the provision of a more
robust definition to clarify the sorts of models that the actual world may be
part of.
When we ask how a theory defines the term ‘possible world’, we are en-
quring into what Quine has called the ideology of that theory.13 Definitions
of ‘possible world’, and hence the truth-conditions of modal claims, may be
either reductive or non-reductive. To explain the difference between these
views, it is worth repeating the truth conditions earlier given for modal
predicate logic claims that feature the possibility operator, making the use
of the term ‘possible world’ explicit:
M,Γ v ♦φ ⇐⇒ there is some possible world ∆ ∈ W : ΓR∆ &
M,∆ v φ
A reductive approach to modality is, roughly, one that gives a definition of
‘possible world’ (and, subsequently, the meaning of the modal operators)
through the use of non-modal terms. The term ‘possible world’ is thus re-
duced to more logically basic non-modal terms, with the meanings of modal
operators then being reduced to a definition in terms of possible worlds.14
A primitive approach to modality is one that only defines ‘possible world’
through making use of modal terms, thereby taking the meaning of the
modal operators as logical primitives.
13Quine (1951), p.14.
14There is a second variant of reductivism, where ‘possible world’ is taken as an unde-
fined primitive. Modal terms would then be said to be reducible to possible worlds, with
no further analysis of the term ‘possible world’ being given. The trouble with this view
is that it is difficult to argue that ‘possible world’ is a suitable primitive, given that it
has a poor claim to being ‘immediately understandable’ (see §2.2). I shall therefore not
consider this variant to be a viable option, and shall take it for granted that the expression
‘possible world’ has to be defined either through modal or non-modal terms.
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To make this distinction more precise, let the following criteria hold: a
reductive definition must be both materially-adequate and non-circular.15
A potential reduction is materially-adequate only if the the left-hand side of
the bi-conditional and the right-hand side receive the same truth-value. A
proposed reduction is non-circular only if the right-side of the bi-conditional
features neither terms from the proscribed class (i.e. modal terms) nor
expressions which are themselves defined through the use of terms from
the proscribed class.16 Having clarified what it means for an account of
modality to be reductive, the remainder of §2 may be devoted to motivating
a reductive account.
0.2.2 Two Principles Motivating Modal Reductivism
The motivations for modal reductivism will now be outlined. Having noted
the instability associated with taking a term as a primitive, two principles
that may be taken to motivate modal reductivism shall be considered. It
will turn out that the second principle is a more promising way to argue
for modal reductivism, whilst simultaneously being particularly difficult to
rigorously define.
Taking a term to be primitive, and ruling out its being defined through
an appeal to other terms, implies that we hold the term to be ‘immediately
understandable’.17 Therefore, using a term as a primitive requires confi-
dence that the vague hints we might drop about its intended interpretation
(in lieu of a full definition) will combine with an intuitive reading of the
term, in order to lead the reader to understand its meaning. It thus seems
that there is an instability associated with taking a term as primitive that is
lacking when it is defined. With a clear definition of a term, there is a way
to guarantee that the (attentive) reader will grasp the intended and correct
meaning of the term, provided the primitives used to define it are immedi-
ately understandable; yet there is no guarantee that a reader (attentive or
otherwise) will greet an undefined primitive with immediate understanding.
An individual must obviously take some terms as primitives. However,
this absence of a guarantee that the meaning of a primitive will be adequately
conveyed results in the following two principles’ being compelling:
1. ‘Picking Plausible Primitives’ : one should only commit oneself to
15Sider (2003), p.197.
16More precisely, we should say that no modal term is used to directly or indirectly
define a term on the right-hand side (see §2.3).
17Tarski (1995), p.118.
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primitives that seem likely to be ‘immediately understandable’ to all
those who encounter them;
2. ‘Limiting Primitives’ : one should commit oneself to as few primitives
as possible in the process of giving adequate definitions.18
Both of these principles seem fairly uncontroversial. However, there may be
doubt regarding their implications for modal discourse. The first principle
will now be discussed briefly, as it will not be directly employed in arguments
for modal reductivism.
To see that the first principle is uncontroversial, consider a scenario in
which a term that is subject to much philosophical debate over its correct
analysis is taken to be primitive. For example, suppose an ethicist wishes
to give a reductive definition of the term ‘evil’. In order to achieve this aim,
he takes the word ‘good’ as a primitive, and proposes as reductive truth-
conditions: “x is evil’ is true if and only if x is not good’.19 This analysis is
unlikely to strike many ethicists as an adequate definition of ‘evil’, given that
their apparent puzzlement over the meaning of the word ‘good’ prevents its
having a good claim to being immediately understandable to them.
Holding that the principle of picking plausible primitives is violated by
treating modal terms as primitive remains a more controversial proposal.
Of course, if one accepts the first principle, and one accepts that modal
terms do not seem to be immediately understandable, then it follows that
a reductive definition of modal terms should be sought. I am personally
convinced of the idea that modal terms are not immediately understandable;
otherwise, I would hardly have chosen to write on the topic of the meaning
of modal expressions, unless I was content with an unusually short thesis.
However, other people have informed me that modal terms strike them as
good candidates for immediately understandable terms. Since debate over
whether or not modal terms violate the first principle rests predominantly
on subjective intuitions, I will not pursue this line of thought.
My emphasis will instead be on the second principle. To reveal how
compelling the idea is that primitives should not be unnecessarily multi-
plied, consider the following scenario: Take a language that only contains
the terms t′, t′′ and t′′′, with attempts’ being made to define such terms.
Definition 1 takes all three terms to be primitives, whereas Definition 2
18A typical statement of this principle in the literature is: ‘According to one principle
of simplicity, more primitive notions are worse than fewer; what primitive ideology we can
eliminate, we should.’ (Wang (2013) p.538.)
19This would obviously exclude morally neutral actions, and so would be an unsatisfac-
tory analysis on other grounds.
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takes t′ and t′′ as primitives whilst reductively defining t′′′ through making
use of the first two terms. It is difficult to imagine how someone could jus-
tify endorsing Definition 1 in such a scenario. For, given the uncertainty
involved in conveying the meaning of a primitive, it seems to be preferable
to minimise the number of such terms that one commits oneself to.
This should illustrate the plausibility of a principle that dictates that
one should endorse as few primitives as one can get away with in giving
adequate definitions of terms. Yet it is surprisingly difficult to clarify the
limiting primitives principle in such a way that the idea behind it is captured.
This shall be attempted in the following section, before the clarified principle
is applied to the topic of modal terms.
0.2.3 Precisifying the Principle of Limiting Primitives
A precise definition of what it means for an individual to be committed
to a primitive must be given, in order to elaborate the limiting primitives
principle. Let T be the set of all the terms of a certain language, and define
a binary relation ≤S on T. This relation is intended to represent the means
by which an individual S defines the terms of her language. In order to
reflect important characteristics of the process of defining terms, ≤S will be
a pre-order. That is:
• ≤S is reflexive (t ≤S t).
• ≤S is transitive (if t ≤S t′ and t′ ≤S t′′ then t ≤S t′′).
Anti-symmetry does not hold, since although we want to say that t ≤S t′
and t′ ≤S t if and only if t =S t′, we would not want to say that =S is
identity ; rather, it is an equivalence relation, and an anti-symmetric partial
order on these equivalence classes could then be defined. The motivation
for denying that =S is identity derives from the fact that terms are not usu-
ally individuated entirely by means of the way in which they are defined,
since the morphemes that compose them must also be taken into account.
It should also be noted that t <S t
′ if and only if t ≤S t′ and t 6=S t′. We
may then use the relation to capture several relevant notions:
1. S uses t′ to define t ⇐⇒ t ≤S t′
2. S uses t′ to directly define t ⇐⇒ t ≤S t′ ∧ ∀t′′((t ≤S t′′ ∧ t′′ ≤S t′)→
(t =S t
′′ ∨ t′ =S t′′))
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3. S treats t, t′ as synonyms ⇐⇒ t =S t′
4. S treats t, t′ as independent terms ⇐⇒ ¬(t ≤S t′) ∧ ¬(t′ ≤S t)
5. S gives a non-circular definition of t ⇐⇒ ∀t′(t <S t′ → ¬(t′ <S t))
6. S treats t as a primitive ⇐⇒ ¬∃t′ : t <S t′
7. S reductively defines t ⇐⇒ S gives a non-circular definition of t such
that t is not treated as a primitive (and a bi-conditional featuring the
terms t′ that S uses to directly define t is materially-adequate).
It initially seems as if characterising these notions allows us to unproblem-
atically define the set PS,t of all primitive terms to which an individual S ’s
definition of t commits him in a simple manner. As an intermediate step,
I will attempt to define the set RS,t of terms relevant to the definition of t
for S (this will be the set of terms that we search for primitives):
(First Attempt): RS,t = {t′ ∈ T : t ≤S t′}
PS,t = {t′ ∈ RS,t : ¬∃t′′(t′ <S t′′)}
It might then appear that one could compare the cardinalities of the two
sets of primitives that the rival definers S, S′ commit themselves to with
their definitions of t.20
However, these definitions are too narrow to capture the intuitive idea
behind the principle of limiting primities. Firstly, consider these notions
applied to the individuals Prim and Red with regards to their (respectively)
primitivist and reductivist definitions of t. It is clear that PPrim,t = {t},
hence |PPrim,t| = 1; yet it is likely to be the case that |PRed,t| > 1. Adopting
this notion would result in the limiting primitives principle’s recommending
to take every term of T as a primitive (‘pan-primitivism’ ). For it would
then be guaranteed that only a single primitive would be used in giving a
definition of each term, yet the reductivist may sometimes find herself in
need of multiple primitives in order to give an adequate reductive definition
of some term. This is precisely the opposite of what the principle of limiting
primitives was intended to dictate.
20For simplicity I have suggested that ≤S is indexed to individuals, but a more accurate
picture would be to say that it is indexed to world-time-individual triples. This would
allow the same individual to consider multiple definitions of the same term, provided their
considering each definition did not occur at the exact same time.
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One might attempt to fix this idea of commitment by stipulating that it
is only appropriate to compare the cardinalities of PS,t, PS′,t when neither S
nor S′ takes t itself as a primitive: in cases like the one earlier described, Prim
automatically ‘loses’ to Red according to the principle of limiting primitives,
and she may save her own account from embarrassment only by questioning
the material-adequacy of Red’s definition. Yet this modified notion is still
far-removed from the idea behind the limiting primitives principle. For
imagine that Prim has summoned the energy to give a reductive definition
of t by means of two terms t′, t′′, but that she has refrained from considering
how to define any other term of T (and is thus assumed to take them as
primitives). Suppose Red has reductively defined t in such a way that it is
incorporated into a complex web of one hundred inter-defined terms of T
that she has been considering, with ten of these terms taken as primitives.
The principle of limiting primitives should surely favour Red’s approach: for,
out of those one hundred terms, Prim ends up with one hundred primitives.
Yet since those one hundred primitives are incomparable to t according
to the ≤Prim relation, they are not taken into account. The principle of
limiting primitives would therefore seem to penalise prolific theorists, and
would deem the ideal situation to be one in which high numbers of primitives
are employed to ensure that terms are independent.
A more effective means of comparing primitives must therefore be sought.
The hope would be to find a way to broaden the notion of comparison such
that any term either individual S or S′ uses to define t becomes relevant
in determining both PS,t and PS′,t. Having separated the sets RS,t and PS,t,
we may seek the desired effect by experimenting with the membership cri-
teria for the set of relevant terms alone. Let us therefore say that, given a
particular rival S′:
(Second Attempt): RS,t = {t′ ∈ T : (t ≤S t′)∨ (∃t′′ : t ≤S′ t′′ ∧ t′′ ≤S t′)}
This modification helps with the two earlier described problematic cases:
firstly, the primitives that definitions of t commit their theorists to may
be compared even if one individual takes t itself as a primitive. That is,
PPrim,t = {t∪{t′ ∈ T : (∃t′′ : t ≤Red t′′∧t′′ ≤Prim t′)∧(¬∃t′′ : t′ <Prim t′′)}};
hence it need no longer be the case that |PPrim,t| = 1, and the principle of
limiting primitives will no longer recommend pan-primitivism. Secondly,
Prim will be committed to any primitives that she employs in defining any
term that Red uses to define t. This precludes situations where Prim may
escape commitment to primitives simply by virtue of being a lazy theorist
and treating the majority of terms as independent.
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However, there is one further situation that this improved attempt con-
tinues to neglect. Suppose Red uses t′ to define t, but Prim treats t and t′ as
independent. According to the modified definition, Prim is now committed
to any primitives that she associates with t′ by virtue of Red’s judgement
of the relevance of t′. This is as it should be. But suppose Prim uses the
primitives t′′ and t′′′ to define t′, whereas Red considers the three terms
t′′, t′′′ and t′ to be independent at the same time as treating the two former
terms as primitives. Now Red will avoid commitment to the primitives t′′
and t′′′. This is the case because Prim has not treated t′ as connected to t,
and hence the terms she uses to define t′ will not be captured by the modi-
fied definition. So now we seem to disadvantage the theorist who postulates
many independent terms! Rather than attempting to implement further
specific criteria for set-inclusion, it seems sensible to switch to the following
formulation:
(Final Version): RS,t = {t′ ∈ T : (t ≤S t′) ∨ (∃t′′ ∈ RS′,t ∧ t′′ ≤S t′)}
In essence, this involves importing a recursive definition of RS,t into the
membership criteria for RS,t itself. For our ‘base case’, it is specified that
all terms S uses to define t are relevant; but a given rival S′ will end up
with a set RS′,t that also includes all terms S
′ uses to define every term in
RS,t due to the new disjunct in the inclusion criteria; and then RS,t will be
required to contain all terms S uses to define any new term in RS′,t, and
so on. It is plausible to assume that genuine definitions of any term t must
always be finite, so a stipulation can be introduced that rules out infinite
chains of associated terms:
1. S uses t′ to define t ⇐⇒ t ≤S t′ ∧ ∃t′′(t′ ≤S t′′ ∧ ¬∃t′′′(t′′ <S t′′′)
Of course, RS,t may still have a very large cardinality if either S or his rival
S′ turn out to be prolific definers with webs of related terms. Yet it seems
safe to assume that, in general, an excessively large number of terms will not
end up being relevant to a single term t. For example, it is unlikely that any
S, S′ considering the term ‘possible’ will make use of the term ‘brisket’. This
final version of the definition of the terms that are relevant to a term being
defined, relative to at most two individuals, shall therefore be employed. I
shall now repeat the definition of the set of primitives PS,t that S’s definition
of t commits her to, before taking stock:
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PS,t = {t′ ∈ RS,t : ¬∃t′′(t′ <S t′′)}
It should be noted that we have ended up with two notions of commitment
to primitives: the first non-comparative notion arises when no rival definer
is chosen, and the second comparative notion occurs when a particular rival
is selected (and the primitives S is committed to will then depend on that
rival).
How should we employ these notions in clarifying the principle of limiting
primitives? First, suppose we take the principle to advocate the minimising
of primitives that one commits oneself to in the non-comparative sense. The
trouble is that the principle of limiting primitives then seems to once more
advocate pan-primitivism, since a primitivist about t only commits himself
(non-comparatively) to a single primitive. On the other hand, suppose we
take the principle to advocate the minimising of primitives that one com-
mits oneself to in the comparative sense. The problem is that there is an
infinite number of rival definitions, so we then seem to require S to count
the number of primitives she (comparatively) commits herself to relative to
every possible rival theory. Since an individual might not have a full range of
rival definitions in mind when developing his definition of t, this is a difficult
condition to reliably pursue.
It seems clear that the use of the term ‘commitment’ in the principle of
limiting primitives should be interpreted in the comparative sense; for the
problem with such an interpretation concerns how to pursue the recommen-
dations of the principle, rather than whether it yields the correct verdict. A
means of reacting to the epistemic uncertainty associated with limiting one’s
commitments relative to infinite hypothetical rivals shall now be sought.
Suppose we take the principle of limiting primitives to advocate the
minimisation of the primitives one commits oneself to in the comparative
sense, but then describe a means to increase the likelihood that one will
commit oneself to fewer primitives than any rival. Of course, the fact that
S will never compare his definition of t to every other conceivable definition
means that his assessment of likely success regarding the limiting primitives
principle is always defeasible. Yet this is seemingly the only approach that
has a chance of describing a means to implement the principle.
Consider the following as a means to increase the chances of one’s limiting
one’s primitives: If one can reductively define a term t, and one’s proposed
reduction includes at least one term t′ that is difficult to reductively define,
then reductively define t and take t′ as a primitive. A term t′ might be
thought to be difficult to reductively define if no combination of terms can
be found that provide a reductive definition, or if t′ appears to have a good
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claim to being a plausible primitive.21 The best evidence for t′’s being
difficult to reductively define will be if most other definitions of t′ take it
as a primitive, provided we assume that everyone is tacitly operating under
the principle of limiting primitives.
The justification for this means of increasing the likelihood of minimising
one’s primitives is explained by the following two considerations: firstly, the
principle of limiting primitives clearly advises a policy of giving reductive
definitions where one can get them. For if one wishes to define the terms t1 ...
tn, then an individual who takes all the terms as primitive can be guaranteed
to commit herself to at least n primitives when she comes to compare her
definition to a rival one; whereas the individual who reductively defines at
least one term of t1 ... tn through making use of some of the other terms
opens up the possibility of committing himself to fewer than n primitives
when a comparison occurs. Of course, there may be cases where t can be
reductively defined by means of t′ and t′ can be reductively defined by means
of t. Such cases explain the presence of the second aspect: if one suspects
that one is using a primitive t′ in one’s reductive definition of t that is not
defined reductively by any rival, then the likelihood that one’s rival will be
committed to t′ once comparison occurs increases. Then, if any rival takes t
as a primitive and also cannot avoid taking t′ as a primitive, the individual
who reductively defines t in terms of the primitive t′ would increase the
chances of committing himself to at least one fewer primitive than the rival;
and if any rival reductively defines t in some different way but also ends
up taking t′ as a primitive, then the individual who reductively defines t in
terms of the primitive t′ will increase the chances of committing himself to
no more primitives than the rival in defining t.
From the principle of limiting primitives and the above condition that
clarifies a means to increase the likelihood of one’s minimising one’s primi-
tives, the following implications for modal reductivism result: if modal ex-
pressions can22 be given a reductive definition, and this reductive definition
21In §2.2, the principle of picking plausible primitives was said to be uncontroversial
but ultimately a poor motivation for modal reductivism. However, there is no reason to
refrain from utilising it as a part of a motivation for modal reductivism, especially when
it is applied not to modal terms themselves but to the terms used to define the modal
terms. One must simply bear in mind that the application of this principle is unlikely to be
decisive: for whenever S states that t′ is a plausible primitive, S′ may come along and say
that, according to her own intuitions, t′ is a ludicrous primitive. The subjective element
to this principle therefore prevents its taking more than a minor role in a motivation for
reductivism.
22It is unfortunate but unavoidable that a modal term is being used in the elaboration
of this principle, when the question we are currently concerned with is the analysis of
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uses non-modal primitive terms that are difficult to reductively define, then
modal reductivism becomes a compelling position.
In this section, it has been argued that we should seek a reductive defini-
tion of ‘possible world’ that increases the likelihood of our (comparatively)
committing ourselves to fewer primitives than any rivals. Having clarified
the sort of definition that we should seek, we may proceed with our search.
0.3 The Type of Reductive Account to Pursue
§3 shall further narrow down the type of reductive definition we should
seek. §3.1 gives a fairly exhaustive list of the different definitions of the
term ‘possible world’ that are prevalent in the literature. Then, in §3.2, it
shall be argued that linguistic ersatzism is the only type of account that
possesses the potential to yield a genuinely reductive definition.
0.3.1 Different Ways of Defining ‘Possible World’
Before an attempt at giving a suitable reductive account of modal claims is
made, the range of options for a definition of ‘possible world’ shall be de-
scribed. These options consist of modal realism and a variety of ersatzisms.
Lewis documents the different ways of construing possible worlds in his
classic work ‘On the Plurality of Worlds’. Lewis himself is a modal realist,
holding that ‘Our world is but one world among many’.23 Modal realists
consider the possible worlds alluded to on the right-hand side of the truth-
conditions for modal predicate logic claims to be alike in kind to the ‘actual’
(from our perspective) world. However, each world is spatiotemporally inac-
cessible from all other worlds.24 For Lewis, ‘A world is the mereological sum
of all the possible individuals that are parts of it, and so are worldmates of
one another’, where two things are ‘worldmates’ if they are spatiotemporally
related.25
Modal realism is opposed to the alternative view Lewis describes, modal
ersatzism. Modal ersatzers hold that ‘instead of an incredible plurality of
concrete worlds, we can have one world only, and countless abstract entities
representing ways that this world might have been’.26 These abstract entities
modal terms. I hope that my giving a successful reductive definition will be sufficient to






are, importantly, part of the actual world.27
This leads to three requirements for a view to be ersatzist: the worlds
must be actual, abstract and connected to ways the world might have been
through representing these ways. Modal realism, in contrast, holds possible
worlds to be non-actual, non-abstract and connected to ways the world might
have been through instantiating these ways.
Ersatzism comes in several varieties, according to the abstract structures
chosen to represent other ways the world might have been. Lycan lists the
forms of ersatzism that have been proposed by various philosophers, which
shall now be summarised.28
The first option is linguistic ersatzism, which holds that possible worlds
are sets of sentences. Both Carnap and Hintikka have at some point en-
dorsed a form of linguistic ersatzism. Hintikka construed his ersatz worlds
as non-maximal sets of atomic and non-atomic sentences,29 whereas Carnap
held them to be maximal sets of atomic sentences.30 Neither view requires
the language out of which these worlds are constructed to be a natural lan-
guage in a literal sense (finite, learnable, etc.);31 it need only be a language
in the sense of having a syntax and semantics. Since possible worlds are
constructed from sets and sentences, they are clearly abstract. Provided
the sentences used are not defined as the sentences ‘possible’ relative to a
given language, possible worlds will also be constructed only from actual
entities.32 Finally, a possible world represents a state as obtaining on the
basis of the inclusion of a sentence that describes that state in the set that
composes the relevant possible world.
A second ersatzer approach is propositional ersatzism, whereby worlds
are constructed out of language-independent propositions. Adams endorsed
this form of ersatzism, holding that a ‘world-story is a maximal-consistent
set of propositions’.33 On this ersatzer view, possible worlds are actual and
abstract in the sense of being composed only of sets and propositions, both
of which are construed as actual, abstract entities. In addition, a possible
world represents a state of affairs by including a proposition that expresses
the obtaining of that state.






32See §7 for a discussion of the linguistic ersatzer’s definition of ‘sentence’.
33Adams (1974) p.225.
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uses re-combinations of the atomic aspects that compose the actual world
in defining ‘possible world’. Originally raised by Quine, Cresswell suggests
a version whereby we consider the set B of all space-time points.34 A ‘pos-
sible world’ Γ is then a subset of B, including only the points occupied at
Γ. The actual world is represented by a subset of B including all and only
the actually occupied space-time points, and every other subset of B counts
as a non-actual world. Castaneda describes a variant of this view, hold-
ing that properties should be considered the ‘ultimate components of the
world’.35 There are various operators that collate properties into those in-
stantiated by each individual.36 A ‘possible world’ is a set of individuals,
with each individual being a set of properties; and non-actual individuals
may be represented by applying an operator to yield a set of properties that
is not instantiated by any actual individual.37 Although the atoms used to
construct possible worlds may be held to be space-time points, properties
or perhaps other structures entirely, all combinatorial ersatzer views share
the ideas that: the atoms that compose possible worlds are aspects of the
actual world ; abstract set-theoretic entities that are isomorphic to alternate
arrangements of the atoms are to function as possible worlds; and a possible
world represents a state of affairs as obtaining if the arrangement of atoms
that it is isomorphic to determines that state of affairs.
This is a fairly exhaustive list of the available ersatzer accounts. Al-
though other varieties of ersatzism are occasionally mentioned in the liter-
ature, those that have been omitted from the current discussion will have
been left out for one of the following two reasons:
1. No one has developed such a variant in detail, and so the features of
a fully-elaborated account cannot be assessed;38
2. It is a form of what Lewis has called ‘magical ersatzism’, which takes
possible worlds to be structures that simply represent due to their
nature and ‘there’s nothing to be said about how they do it’.39
My complaint about magical ersatzism is that it is closely associated with





38For example, Lycan’s idea (in Lycan (1994) p.46) of taking possible worlds to be
‘mental entities’ of some form has not received full consideration as of yet, and was omitted
from the current discussion on these grounds.
39Lewis (1986) p.141.
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which takes the term ‘possible world’ as an undefined primitive. The doubts
that I described about this reductive approach thus generalise to variants of
magical ersatzism, which is why such views have not been included as viable
ersatzist accounts in this section.40
Finally, the space of worlds generated by a particular definition of ‘pos-
sible world’ may be categorised depending on the features it instantiates.41
One might define ‘possible world’ in such a way that the space of worlds
generated is well-behaved, in the sense that the worlds that exist and fail
to exist do so according to some underlying principle. Call such a space of
worlds ‘principled’. In particular, one may want the space of worlds to obey
a principle that ensures the space matches some pre-theoretical notion of
the totality of possibilities. Alternatively, if one defines ‘possible world’ so
that its extension merely includes a brute pattern of worlds obeying no such
principle, then call the space of worlds ‘unprincipled’. If a space of (real or
ersatz) worlds includes intuitive impossibilities and excludes intuitive pos-
sibilities, I shall refer to such a space of worlds as ‘chaotic’. Unprincipled
spaces, then, have a marked propensity to be chaotic; whereas principled
spaces may be devoid of chaos if the principle underlying their construction
effectively causes the space to include all and only the intuitive possibili-
ties.42
At this point it should also be remarked that there are degrees of chaos.
At the most extreme end, a space of worlds may be chaotic if there are
worlds at which logical contradictions are true. Such a space of worlds would
clearly fail to function as a materially-adequate reductive analysis of modal
expressions, since it is generally accepted that if anything is impossible, then
the truth of logical contradictions surely is. Then there are lesser degrees
of chaos, whereby logical contradictions are successfully excluded from the
space of worlds but the intuitive truth-values of other modal claims may fail
to be reflected.43. Distinguishing between degrees of chaos will therefore be
40For example, Lycan’s elaboration (Lycan (1994) p.46) of Stalnaker’s view that possible
worlds are to be construed as ‘ways things might have been’, which cannot be ‘reduced
to items of any more familiar kind’, has been omitted from the current list due to its
plausibly counting as a magical ersatzer view.
41When I use the expression ‘space of (possible) worlds’, I of course mean ‘space’ in
some metaphorical sense: on the modal realist’s view, the spatiotemporal dislocation that
obtains between worlds means that the pluriverse itself is not a ‘space’ in any literal sense;
and on the ersatz picture, worlds are abstract objects, so are not spatiotemporally located
at all.
42Note that some principled spaces of worlds might turn out to be chaotic (i.e. if the
principle that is used to generate them is ineffective). Similarly, an unprincipled space of
worlds may turn out to be non-chaotic, through a massive stroke of good fortune.
43Of course, it is often difficult to tell how much uniformity there is over the ‘intuitive’
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important, because a space of worlds that might be argued to display some
degree of chaos can more plausibly be shown to yield a materially-adequate
bi-conditional (through questioning whether the modal facts represented in
the space of worlds really do violate modal intuitions) than a space of worlds
that displays total chaos.
In this section, a full range of ways of defining ‘possible world’ has been
described, and a means to categorise the definitions according to the type
of space of worlds they generate has been given. These matters have been
discussed in preparation for an endorsement of linguistic ersatzism as the
only account with the potential to be reductive.
0.3.2 Linguistic Ersatizism as a Reductive Account
It shall now be explained why many philosophers are dubious about the
potential for a reductive ersatzer account of modal terms. It will then be
argued that linguistic ersatzism actually exemplifies the greatest potential
for a reductive account of modal expressions.
There is a pervasive view, which may be traced back to Lewis, that
only modal realism has the potential to yield genuinely reductive accounts
of modal terms. This view is grounded in the perception that the modal
realist ‘explicates modality just in terms of big, lumpy physical objects – no
modal primitives, Lewis claims’.44 However, I believe that Lewis ends up
making use of tacit modal primitives in defining the term ‘possible world’,
due to his attempts at generating a principled space of worlds that matches
our pre-theoretical notions of possibility and impossibility. In short, Lewis’s
definition of a ‘world’ as a mereological sum of spatiotemporally related
individuals does not say enough to ensure that there is a possible world for
each intuitive possibility. For example, it might so happen that there is no
mereological sum in which horned horses exist. If we maintain that it is
possible for horses to have horns, then the relevant bi-conditional has a false
right-hand side and a true left-hand side, meaning that material-adequacy
is lost. Lewis is aware of this, and attempts to generate a principled space of
worlds through employing a principle of recombination. This principle holds
that ‘anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy
distinct spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist
with anything else.’45 Hence, it is guaranteed that there is a world in which
truth-values of modal claims (though there can be some confidence that there is great




horses coexist with appropriately placed horns. However, it should be clear
that the quantifiers in this principle must range over non-actual individuals
if the principle is to generate the principled space of worlds that Lewis
wants: for Lewis believes that ‘alien’ individuals, composed of parts that
are not duplicates of any parts of actual individuals, are possible.46 If the
principle is to deliver these alien individuals, it must range over every alien
property in the first place. Yet it seems that alien individuals and properties
would only be available to the quantifiers on the grounds that they are (in
Lewis’s eyes) possible. I therefore accept the argument that the principle of
recombination uses a term the sense of which can only be conveyed through
modal terms (specifically, ‘anything’ is tacitly interpreted to mean ‘anything
possible’), and hence fails the non-circularity condition.47 Moreover, if a
modal realist were to eliminate principles that contain modal terms from
their definition of ‘world’, then the resulting unprincipled space would be
likely to be chaotic (e.g. due to the omission of worlds in which there are
horned horses) and hence fail the material-adequacy condition. Therefore,
modal realism arguably fails to result in a genuinely reductive account of
modal terms, since it violates either the non-circularity or material-adequacy
conditions.
I now aim to show Lewis’s claim that no ersatzer account can be reductive
to be similarly debatable. The potential for reductive ersatzer accounts shall
be considered, and it will be argued that linguistic ersatzism seems to present
a promising reductive approach.
It is first worth examining Lewis’s reasons for holding that no ersatzer
view can be reductive in more detail. Lewis’s central argument is that the
only way to exclude contradictory states of affairs from being represented in
the ersatz worlds without using an explicit modal term would be to employ
some notion of consistency. However, he holds that the only plausible defini-
tion of ‘consistency’ that successfully rules out intuitively impossible worlds
‘is prima facie a modal distinction: a set of sentences is consistent iff those
sentences, as interpreted, could all be true together’.48 Likewise for the def-
inition of ‘consistency’ for propositions, properties or occupied space-time
points. Of course, the definition Lewis describes does make use of a modal
term, meaning that any ersatz view that defines a ‘possible world’ as a set
of Lewisian-consistent something-or-other would, on analysis, be revealed to
fail the non-circularity condition.
46Lewis (1986) p.91.
47For further discussion on the circularity of Lewis’s putative reductive definition, see
Divers (2002) p.121; and Lycan (1994) p.38 and pp.87-9.
48Lewis (1986) p.151.
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However, an alternative notion of consistency may be defined that avoids
violating the non-circularity condition. This alternative notion of consis-
tency is a syntactic form of consistency that will be argued in §4.1 to avoid
invoking any modal primitives, thereby being non-circular. Such syntactic
consistency may be defined as a property of sets of sentences; however, it
cannot be defined as a property of non-linguistic entities such as mereologi-
cal sums of individuals, sets of atomic simples or sets of propositions. This
prevents it from being similarly used in the definition of ‘possible world’ for
modal realists, combinatorial ersatzers or propositional ersatzers. Therefore,
whilst Lewis’s argument against the potential for reductive ersatzer accounts
is correct with regards to propositional and combinatorial ersatzisms, lin-
guistic ersatzism has not yet been ruled out as a viable reductive account.
Moreover, given the arguable failure of modal realist reductive accounts, only
linguistic ersatzism has the potential to give a successful reductive account
of modal terms. Linguistic ersatzism will thus be focused on hereafter.
Whilst it has just been argued that linguistic ersatzism instantiates the
greatest potential for a successful reductive account, it has not yet been de-
termined whether we should adopt a reductive, linguistic ersatzer account.
Recall that, in §2.3, it was concluded that if modal expressions can be given
a reductive definition that is associated with non-modal primitives that the
rival definers are likely to be committed to anyway once the definitions are
compared, then we should be modal reductivists. It was also said that a
rival definer is likely to be committed to a primitive term t upon compari-
son of definitions if t is difficult to reductively define. Finally, t is difficult
to reductively define if no combination of terms that allow a successful re-
ductive definition are forthcoming, or if t appears to have a good claim
to being a plausible primitive. We must therefore check whether the lin-
guistic ersatzer’s primitives, set and sentence, are difficult to reductively
define. Now, Lewis himself notes that linguistic ersatzism ‘fulfils its promise
of safe and sane ontology’ by relying on ‘ontology that most philosophers are
committed to in any case’.49 Let us assume that one is committed to incor-
porating some x into one’s ontology just in case a term used to refer to x is
endorsed as a primitive. Lewis’s comment may then be read as a concession
that most philosophers accept the terms ‘set’ and ‘sentence’ as primitives.
It is certainly the case that the term ‘set’ is taken as a primitive within
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.50 Furthermore, within linguistics, there is a
fairly tight circle of inter-definable terms (such as ‘sentence’, ‘string’, ‘utter-
49Lewis (1986) p.143.
50Leung and Chen (1992) p.vii.
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ance’, ‘grammatical’, ‘language’, etc.), at least one of which must be taken as
primitive and used to reductively define the others. Since widespread accep-
tance of a primitive term was said to be good evidence of its being difficult
to reductively define, we may conclude that the terms ‘set’ and ‘sentence’
are difficult to reductively define.51 All of this indicates that rival defin-
ers are likely to be committed to the primitives endorsed by the linguistic
ersatzer. Hence adopting a reductive linguistic ersatzer account increases
the likelihood that the number of primitives one (comparatively) commits
oneself to will be less than that of a rival. This completes the motivation to
adopt a successful linguistic ersatzer account, should one be found.
0.4 A Reductive Linguistic Ersatzer Account
In §4.1, ‘consistency’ and ‘maximality’ shall be defined in such a way that
using them to explicate the term ‘possible world’ meets the non-circularity
condition. It will be conceded in §4.2 that the material-adequacy of the
proposed account is more difficult to defend, in light of an objection from
Lewis. In §4.3 the proposed account will be modified to include assumption-
relative accessibility relations and assumption-relative modal operators. §4.4
will then argue that this modified account is materially-adequate in addition
to being non-circular.
0.4.1 A Non-circular Definition of ‘Possible World’
As mentioned in §1.1, modal predicate logic’s basis in classical logic means
that it assumes both the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded
middle.52 This means that the set of formulas true at a possible world
must be both consistent (no formula P is both true and false at a single
world, from the law of non-contradiction) and maximal (every formula P of
the relevant language is either true or false at each world, after the law of
excluded middle). Given that these two conditions must hold for the set of
wffs true at each world, it seems that they may be of use in characterising
possible worlds. Having defined consistency and maximality more rigorously,
the way in which these notions may be used in giving a non-circular definition
of the term ‘possible world’ shall be elaborated.
Where S is a set of wffs formed using the predicates, variables, connec-
tives and quantifiers of the non-modal component of a language of modal
51In those cases where ‘sentence’ is reductively defined, the definer will still commit
himself to at least one related primitive (e.g. ‘language’).
52Kleene (2002), p.8.
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predicate logic MPL′,53 and L′ is a system of modal logic, S is L′-inconsistent
iff there are φ1...φn ⊂ S such that `L′ ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn). S is L′-consistent
iff S is not L′-inconsistent. In words, a set of sentences S is consistent for a
language and system of modal predicate logic if and only if there is no finite
subset of S for which the negation of the conjunction of its members is a
theorem of the relevant system of logic.
A set S of wffs is said to be maximal iff, for every wff φ of MPL′−,−♦,
either φ ∈ S or ¬φ ∈ S.
A set S of wff is maximal-consistent iff, unsurprisingly, S is both consis-
tent and maximal. It is provable that every consistent set can be extended to
a maximal-consistent set.54 This is achieved by showing that, given a consis-
tent and non-maximal set S, for every wff P either P or ¬P can be added to
S, and a consistent set will result. For suppose S∪P resulted in an inconsis-
tent set, and S∪¬P also resulted in an inconsistent set. From the definition
of consistency, this would mean that there would be some φ1...φn ⊂ S such
that (i) `L′ ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn ∧ P ) and (ii) `L′ ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn ∧ ¬P ). Since
it can never be the case that `L′ ¬(P ) and `L′ ¬(¬P ) (by the law of non-
contradiction), (i) and (ii) can be true only when `L′ ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn). But
this would mean that S itself would be inconsistent, contra the original as-
sumption. We take the union of all these additions, which is guaranteed to
exist by Zorn’s lemma.55 It is then easy to show that the union is maximal-
consistent. Furthermore, we require each maximal-consistent set S to have
the ‘∀-property’.56 It is thus clear that, for every set S that is consistent
but non-maximal, there will be a maximal-consistent extension.
A maximal-consistent set of wff S may be said to be connected with a
world Γ iff, if a wff φ is true at Γ, then φ ∈ S; and, conversely, if φ ∈ S
then φ is true at Γ. Since it can be proven that every consistent set can be
extended to a maximal-consistent set, this means that every consistent set
53We could of course define maximal-consistency with regards to the modal component
of MPL′ as well. However, the account that I will go on the devleop does not require the
inclusion of modal expressions in the maximal-consistent sets that worlds are construed
as in order to be coherent. Furthermore, the reductive aspect of the account is most con-
vincingly implemented by eliminating modal terms entirely from the maximal-consistent
sets invoked on the right-hand side of the bi-conditional.
54Cresswell and Hughes (2012), p.115-6.
55See Enderton (2001), p.7.
56This is to rule out situations in which ¬∀xφx ∈ S but φy ∈ S for all variables y.
In such a scenario, every finite subset of S is L′-consistent, but there is no witness to
¬∀xφx, and no witness can be added without rendering S inconsistent. In short, if S is
maximal-consistent and has the ∀-property, then if ∀xφ /∈ S, there must be a witness y
such that φxy (φ with all occurrences of x replaced with occurences of y) /∈ S. For more
details, see Cresswell and Hughes (2012), p.257.
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can be extended to a set that is connected with some world.
The thought might then arise that a possible world just is a maximal-
consistent set of wff. Without good reason to refrain from considering the
connection relation to be identity (that is, S is connected with Γ iff S = Γ),
it seems that we might as well do so. The motivation for this approach would
be its plausibility as a non-circular definition of the term ‘possible world’.
Consider the version of the bi-conditional that will result from explicating
the definition of a ‘possible world’ that has been given:
• M,Γ v ♦φ ⇐⇒ there is some maximal-consistent set ∆ ∈W : ΓR∆
and ∆ v φ
• Furthermore, if φ is free of modal operators, then ∆ v φ ⇐⇒ φ ∈ ∆.
It will now be argued that these new truth-conditions are non-circular. To
be non-circular, it was firstly said that modal terms cannot appear on the
right-hand side of the bi-conditional (except possibly in φ). This condition
has clearly been met. Secondly, vocabulary which can only be adequately
understood by using modal terms is not permitted on the right side. The def-
initions of maximality and consistency do not make use of such vocabulary.
Therefore, these truth-conditions are non-circular. With this definition in
mind, we can continue to use the term ‘possible world’, despite the presence
of the modal term ‘possible’; for it has been shown that the term ‘possible
world’ is non-circular under the proposed analysis.
0.4.2 Lewis’s Material-Adequacy Objection
It will now be conceded that the most significant argument against the pro-
posed linguistic ersatzer account is one that questions its material-adequacy.
A modification to the account, brought about through re-conceiving of the
accessibility relation, will be argued to ensure material-adequacy.
Lewis opposes linguistic ersatzer accounts that make use of the non-
circular, syntactic form of consistency in their putatively reductive definition
of the term ‘possible world’. His objection is that they generate a chaotic
space of worlds. This is the case because this syntactic definition of ‘con-
sistency’ only prevents the affirmation and denial of the very same formula,
which means that it yields ‘allegedly consistent ersatz worlds according to




To see Lewis’s point, let the truth-conditions for the sentence ‘It is possi-
ble that there is at least one married bachelor’ be translated into a language
MPL′ as follows:
M,Γ v ♦(∃x)(Mx ∧ Bx) ⇐⇒ ∃∆ ∈ W : ΓR∆ and M,∆ v
(∃x)(Mx ∧Bx)
According to the current definition of ‘possible world’, the right-hand side of
the above bi-conditional is true: for, as Lewis points out, there is no syntactic
inconsistency in the wff (∃x)(Mx ∧ Bx). This is the case because M and
B are two unrelated predicates in the modal predicate logic language. Yet
Lewis claims that (∃x)(Mx∧Bx), when interpreted as the English claim ‘it is
possible that there is at least one married bachelor’, is intuitively false. The
fact that this sentence is intuitively false is due to ‘the logical connections
that hold between interpreted non-logical terms’.58
There are two choices about how to construe this data: firstly, one might
disagree with Lewis’s claim that the ‘allegedly consistent worlds’ do instan-
tiate intuitive ‘impossibilities’. Secondly, one might agree with his claim.
Both strategies seem to lead to problems for the proposed linguistic ersatzer
account.
Firstly, consider someone who claims, contra Lewis, that married bach-
elors are possible. It is unlikely that such a person reached this view on
the basis of her own pre-theoretical intuitions about the truth-value of the
claim ‘It is possible for there to be married bachelors’, or on the basis of
her pre-theoretical presumptions about the intuitions the majority of people
will have about this claim. This is the case because it is difficult to deny
that the natural response to an individual who said ‘Did you know, it’s pos-
sible for there to be married bachelors?’ would be to assume that he had
misunderstood the terms or was in the process of telling a joke. The person
who disagrees with Lewis is more likely to believe that married bachelors
are possible on the basis of the fact that there are syntactically consistent
linguistic ersatzer worlds in which there are married bachelors. In short, she
would seem to have such a commitment to the proposed analysis of modal
claims that she would believe that, if a world exists in which the proposition
that P holds, then ♦P is true; and if no world exists in which the proposition
that P holds, then ♦P is false. She will therefore respond to any accusations
of material-inadequacy by arguing that, contra the standard intuitions, the
truth-value of the disputed modal claim does in fact match the truth-value
58Ballarin (2005) p.279.
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of the putative reduction on the right-hand side.
However, it should be recalled that the aim of a reductive definition is
to clarify the meaning of the analysandum. Disregarding the truth-values
that a high proportion of people intuitively attribute to the left-hand side
of the relevant bi-conditional is a troubling way to proceed. For if one
could stipulate that the truth-values of claims on the right-hand side of the
bi-conditional determine those on the left, then material-adequacy will be
guaranteed no matter how tenuous the connection between the analysandum
and the analysans. To illustrate this concern, Shalkowski (1994) writes that
‘Instead of thinking that [W ] is a set of worlds, think of it as the set of
pencils in my drawer, with ... R as a relation among these pencils. Clearly,
anyone proposing truth about all these pencils as necessary truth and truth
about at least one pencil as possible truth would be guilty of co-opting the
terms ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ and giving them stipulative definitions’.59
In short, this first strategy is susceptible to an arbitrariness objection: that
is, if the intuitive meaning and truth-value of the analysandum is ignored
in order to maintain material-adequacy, then it is not clear why one should
attempt to reductively define modal terms by means of maximal-consistent
sets rather than truths about the pencils in Shalkowski’s drawer. Therefore,
priority must be given to the truth-values of the claims on the left side of
the bi-conditional, as far as we can discern them.
What, then, of the second strategy? If one agrees with Lewis that it is
impossible for there to be married bachelors, then the material-adequacy of
any account that attempts to reductively define ‘possible world’ as ‘maximal
(syntactically)-consistent set of sentences’ is undermined. For the truth-
values of the left-hand and right-hand side of the bi-conditional will differ in
some cases. On this perspective, the space of worlds generated by the current
account will display some degree of chaos less extreme than total chaos: for
although we might take cheer from the fact that logical contradictions are
still correctly ruled to be impossible (preventing total chaos), it can be
demonstrated that a class of impossibilities marginally less offensive than
logical contradictions are represented in the space of worlds.
The proponent of the current account does not look to be in a good
position: she is barred from claiming that it is in fact true that it is possi-
ble that there are married bachelors, since she would seemingly be making
this claim due to her prioritising the implications of her theoretical com-
mitments, thus violating the non-arbitrariness condition. The proponent of
the current account also encounters problems when she concedes that the
59Shalkowski (1994) p.279.
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proposition expressed by the sentence ‘It is possible for there to be married
bachelors’ is intuitively false, as the proposed reductive definition of modal
terms therefore lacks material-adequacy.
Fortunately, I believe that there is a third response to Lewis’s objection,
which avoids dooming the current account to fail either the non-arbitrariness
or material-adequacy conditions.
0.4.3 Relative Accessibility Relations
The proposed strategy to address Lewis’s concern about material-adequacy
involves exploiting the fact that the truth-conditions require there to be
an accessible world in which the prejacent holds. The definition of the
accessibility relation shall thus be altered, and the types of modal operators
that are included in the languages of modal predicate logics will be re-
construed.
The notion of an accessibility relation was explained in §1.1, where it was
shown how defining a model M requires the stipulation of a binary relation
R on worlds. Of course, the stipulated accessibility relation must accord
with the modal wff true at each w ∈ W ; that is, R cannot hold of 〈w,w′〉
if w v φ and w′ v ¬φ. But beyond that requirement, no guidelines
have been issued about the accessibility relations one should stipulate for
the consideration of a certain modal claim.
One way to answer Lewis’s objection would therefore be to claim that,
in considering the claim ♦(∃x)(Mx ∧ Bx), we generally select an acces-
sibility relation that results in there being no accessible worlds in which
(∃x)(Mx ∧ Bx) holds. That way, the right-hand side of the bi-conditional
would correctly be ruled as false, matching the intuitive truth-value of the
left-hand side and preserving material-adequacy. However, the problem with
such a simple approach is that it has not been explained why or how the
individual considering this modal claim selects this accessibility relation.
In seeking an alternative means to use the accessibility relation to achieve
the desired effect, it is first worth considering why it is intuitively false that
it is possible for there to be married bachelors. It seems to be the case that
this is so because certain assumptions about the meanings of the predicates
are being made. It is being assumed that the predicates are defined in a
way that excludes them from applying to the same objects, and so worlds in
which these predicates have different meanings are ignored when considering
the claim. The idea of assumptions’ acting to restrict the worlds that are
considered to be relevant to the truth-value of a given modal claim will
therefore be the key proposal developed in this section.
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A set of assumptions A may informally be thought of as the hypotheses
endorsed by the individual considering a certain modal claim.60 The first
condition on the wffs within A will be that they are well-formed formulas of
the non-modal components of the appropriate language MPL′. Additional
conditions will be that A is a finite, consistent set of wffs. Finally, A may be
the empty set if an individual does not assume anything that will constrain
the set of accessible worlds.
Instead of proposing that the accessibility relation R should be stipulated
in such a way as to guarantee material-adequacy, it will now be proposed
that a set of assumptions A is instead selected in a context. Once a set of
assumptions has been selected, an assumption-relative accessibility relation
RA will be automatically derived. The definition of a Kripke frame will
therefore need to be altered. The following ideas are adapted from Balbiani
(1996) and (1999), where parameter-relative accessibility relations are con-
sidered for their application to information systems and multimodal logics.61
For a logic L′ and a language MPL′, let a relative frame FREL = 〈W,R〉,
where R is a relative accessibility function from the sets of finite, consis-
tent wffs A of MPL′−,−♦ to binary relations on W. Then a relative model
MREL = 〈FREL, D, l〉. Within a model, the wffs of the assumption-set A
will receive interpretations and valuations alongside the wffs of the worlds
of the model. That is, within a relative model MREL, every interpretation l
and variable assignment v will assign the same extension to each variable or
predicate α whether α is an element of some world or of some assumption-
set.
The relative accessibility function will now be defined. Given a set of
wffs A as input, a relative accessibility function will yield a relative accessi-
bility relation R(A) (abbreviated as RA), where RA is a binary relation on
W. Given a world Γ as input, a relative accessibility relation will yield the
set of all worlds ∆ whereby ∆ is accessible from Γ relative to A. It shall be
stipulated that a world ∆ is accessible from Γ relative to A if and only if ∆
is compatible with every wff of A. Formally:
〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ RA (or ΓRA∆) ⇐⇒ A ∪∆ is L′-consistent
There cannot be any wff of the language MPL′−,−♦ that is consistent with
a maximal-consistent set of the language MPL′ but not already an element
60See §7 for more details on the process of selecting assumptions.
61Though bear in mind a significant difference between my approach and Balbiani’s:
his assumption-sets are in a language distinct from the modal predicate logic language,
whereas mine are not.
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of that set. It follows that A can be consistent with ∆ if and only if every
wff of A is already an element of ∆. In short:
A ∪∆ is L′-consistent ⇐⇒ A ⊆ ∆
If A is the empty set, then every maximal-consistent set for the relevant
language MPL′ and logic L′ will be consistent with A, and hence will be
A-accessible. Finally, note that for all A′, A′′ of the domain of the relative
accessibility function, R is a relation such that:
R(A′ ∪A′′) = R(A′) ∩R(A′′); and R(A′ ∩A′′) = R(A′) ∪R(A′′)62
The preceding discussion should have made the features of relative accessibil-
ity relations clearer. However, a problem with the proposed truth-conditions
is that the selection of RA has turned out to be totally arbitrary, since there
is no connection between the left side of the bi-conditional and the relative
accessibility relation on the right. In brief, it is unclear why the truth of ♦φ
at Γ should depend on the presence of A-accessible worlds at which φ holds,
rather than A′-accessible worlds.
As a solution, let the definition of the language of modal predicate logic
from §1.1 be amended with respect to the modal operators:
• MPL′ includes a finite number of relative modal possibility opera-
tors ♦A1...♦An for each finite, consistent set A1...An of MPL′−,−♦ ⊂
MPL′.
The dual of the relative possibility operator will be the relative necessity
operator, defined in the usual way. A claim φ prefixed by a modal operator
OA should be read as ‘φ is possible (/necessary) relative to A’. It is being
proposed that, when a modal claim is issued at a world, the modal term is
tacitly relativised to an assumption-set. The addition of such relative modal
operators may be seen to give us the following truth-conditions:
MREL,Γ v ♦Aφ ⇐⇒ ∃∆ ∈W : ΓRA∆ and MREL,∆ v φ
Now, RA is selected as the relevant accessibility relation, rather than RA′ ,
due to the fact that the modal operator prefixing the claim to be assessed
has the appropriate subscript.
62Balbiani (1996) p.30.
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It should be noted that this definition of relative accessibility relations
entails that, if ΓRA∆ for some Γ, then ΓRA∆ for any Γ; for the only
condition on 〈Γ,∆〉 standing in the RA relation is that A ⊆ ∆. At first,
this might seem to be an unwelcome result, since flexible properties of the
accessibility relation may no longer be stipulated. However, it should be
recalled that one of my aims is to model the process by which modal claims
are issued. Therefore, if arguments pertaining to the suitability of a less
flexible accessibility relation for modelling modal discourse are compelling,
then the inflexibility of relative accessibility relations should not be perceived
to pose a problem.
First consider the matter of reflexive relations. There will be some cases
where A∪Γ is consistent, and other cases where A∪Γ is inconsistent. There-
fore RA will be reflexive at some worlds, and non-reflexive at others. The
situation is similar for symmetry. I would argue that this reflects modal
discourse: in general, individuals attempt to make true assumptions, and
will subsequently invoke a reflexive accessibility relation if they succeed and
inadvertently invoke a non-reflexive relation if they fail; in some cases, such
as when issuing counterfactual modal claims, it seems to me that individu-
als deliberately try to employ false assumptions, and they therefore invoke
non-reflexive accessibility relations if they succeed. It should also be borne
in mind that some reflexive relative accessibility relation can always be iden-
tified; it is simply the case that one might need to employ a relation that
is relative to a different assumption-set A′, or consider a world that differs
from Γ only insofar as A ∪ Γ is consistent.
Transitivity is a more complex matter. It is clear that a formula AAφ
will hold at a world Γ if and only if Aφ does, since the A-accessible worlds
from those that are A-accessible from Γ will be the same set as those worlds
that are A-accessible from Γ. No truly non-transitive relative accessibility
relation can be identified according to the current approach, then. However,
despite the fact that non-transitivity is a useful property to reflect in the
semantics of modal logics, it is no great loss to constrain it if a speaker would
never issue a claim of the form AAφ instead of Aφ. I would suggest that
all modal claims that seemingly employ a non-transitive accessibility rela-
tion in fact involve ‘pseudo-non-transitivity’, in the sense that the modal
operators are associated with distinct assumption-sets.63 For note that a
63For example, consider the sort of exchange that might support the claim that non-
transitive accessibility relations are required to analyse modal discourse:
Red : ‘It might be possible to have your sentence reduced’;
Prim: ‘So you’re saying it’s possible for my sentence to be reduced?’;
Red : ‘No, it would be premature to say that ... I’ll need to consult the case law’.
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formula AA′φ may hold at Γ when either Aφ or A′φ fails to hold. The
first scenario arises in cases where φ holds in every A′-accessible world but
not every A-accessible one; and the second scenario arises when A ∪ Γ is
inconsistent but one of the assumptions in A′ involves an expression that is
indexical on the world ∆ that A′ is at,64 with the truth of A′φ depending
on ∆’s being consistent with A. Psuedo-non-transitive accessibility rela-
tions between worlds can always be captured, if one selects assumption-sets
and worlds carefully. In summary, I do not perceive it to be problematic
that relative accessibility relations are more constrained than the accessibil-
ity relations within Kripke semantics, since they are arguably sufficient to
accommodate the modal claims actually expressed by speakers.
In this subsection, assumption-relative accessibility relations and assumption-
relative modal operators were defined and used to modify the definitions of
§1.1. The account that is being endorsed has been altered: non-relative
modal operators have been eliminated from the languages of modal pred-
icate logic, and replaced with assumption-relative modal operators. The
way in which these alterations help guarantee material adequacy will be
explained in the next subsection.
0.4.4 A Materially-Adequate Definition of ‘Possible World’
In order to see how the notion of assumption-relative accessibility relations
helps preserve material-adequacy in the face of the issue identified by Lewis,
the earlier example concerning the possibility of married bachelors shall be
returned to. The truth-conditions for this problematic claim were:
M,Γ v ♦(∃x)(Mx ∧ Bx) ⇐⇒ ∃∆ ∈ W : ΓR∆ and M,∆ v
(∃x)(Mx ∧Bx)
It was conceded that, on the account previously endorsed, material-adequacy
was lost due to the existence of a maximal-consistent set that has (∃x)(Mx∧
Bx) as an element. In the previous section, accessibility relations between
sets were looked at in more detail, and assumption-relative accessibility re-
lations were defined. The new, assumption-relative truth-conditions for the
I would read this exchange as involving two different flavours of modality, such that a
suitable paraphrase is: ‘It is compatible with my knowledge that the world is such that
the law is compatible with your sentence’s being reduced’. Hence this is an instance of
pseudo-non-transitivity.
64See §6.2 and §7 for clarification regarding what it means for an assumption-set to be
at a world.
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problematic claim will be the following:
MREL,Γ v ♦A(∃x)(Mx∧Bx) ⇐⇒ ∃∆ ∈W : ΓRA∆ and MREL,∆ v
(∃x)(Mx ∧Bx)
The relevant set of assumptions will be fixed by the individual who is as-
sociated with the claim.65 He might have A as the empty set, in which
case there will be an accessible world in which the problematic embedded
claim holds. However, he may alternatively make assumptions about the
meanings of the predicates, in order to restrict the relative modal operator
to the worlds in which the predicates M and B never apply to the same
domain-member:
A = {(∀x)(Bx→ ¬Mx)}66
The assumption set A contains a single wff that bars any individual from
having M and B simultaneously predicated of it. This is a meaning postu-
late, which is an axiom that imposes restrictions on the interactions of the
predicates of a language. Since the wff included in A is inconsistent with
any set that includes the formula (∃x)(Mx∧Bx), it can be guaranteed that
there will be no accessible world in which this formula holds; so the right-
hand of the bi-conditional will be false, in accordance with the falsity of the
left-hand side given such assumptions about the meanings of the predicates.
However, it has only been shown that some assumptions A may be em-
ployed that rule out worlds that make the formula ♦A(∃x)(Mx ∧Bx) true.
To avoid Lewis’s objection, it must be shown that there is a way to guarantee
that bi-conditionals featuring this claim will be materially-adequate.
There are two ways to use the apparatus of assumption-relative accessi-
bility relations to argue that material-adequacy for the claim ‘It is possible
for there to be married bachelors’ is guaranteed in the face of Lewis’s ob-
jection. The first will involve holding that there are some circumstances
in which an assumption-set A is selected that renders ♦A(∃x)(Mx ∧ Bx)
true, since it is possible in the broadest sense of the word for there to be
married bachelors. The advocate of this first strategy will say that the rea-
son claims about the possibility of married bachelors intuitively seem false
is that the situations in which we wish to consider the broadest sense of
65At the moment, I am being deliberately vague about exactly which individual this is.
See §7 for further clarification.
66Carnap (1988) p.223.
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possibility and the entire space of worlds are incredibly rare. Normally, the
set of assumptions is non-empty, and at least includes meaning postulates
about the relevant terms.
The second strategy will involve agreeing with Lewis that ♦A(∃x)(Mx∧
Bx) is always false. The advocate of this second approach obviously needs to
reconcile this idea with the fact that an unbounded accessibility relation will
yield maximal-consistent sets in which the embedded claim is represented
as true. To do this, he will hold that the entire space of possible worlds is
not given by all maximal-consistent sets for a specific logic, language and
domain; instead, it is given by all maximal-consistent sets for a logic, lan-
guage and domain that are compatible with assumption-sets featuring certain
meaning postulates of the relevant language. I doubt the set of appropriate
meaning postulates for a language is sufficiently clearly defined to allow the
desired assumption-sets to be generated by the inclusion criteria of being an
appropriate meaning postulate. More plausibly, an advocate of this second
strategy would have to either individually list the meaning postulates that
he takes to yield the absolute space of worlds, or find some ingenious means
of specifying the general form that the desired meaning postulates will take.
This strikes me as a significant challenge; still, if successful, his approach
would mean that the set of assumptions A may never be empty.
It should be clear that both strategies converge with regards to endors-
ing the technique of assumption-relative accessibility relations for narrowing
down the space of accessible worlds. The difference arises in how narrow they
choose to make the absolute space of worlds. With regards to the choice be-
tween these two strategies, my preference would be for the first strategy.
This is the case because I personally find it more undesirable to hold that
modal logic incorrectly characterises many impossible worlds as possible
than that it is possible (in an extremely broad, generally useless way) for
there to be married bachelors. Moreover, I think the practical challenge
noted for the second strategy causes more difficulties than it solves. How-
ever, either strategy is compatible with the current account. Provided one
of the strategies seems tolerable, we may put aside the issue of where the
boundaries of the absolute space of worlds fall and leave it as a matter of
preference for individual theorists.
It will now, at last, be argued that assumption-relative accessibility rela-
tions guarantee material-adequacy for every modal predicate logic claim. If
an individual believes that a certain modal claim is true or false, but this in-
tuitive truth-value does not appear to be reflected on the right-hand side of
the appropriate bi-conditional, then this mismatch between the truth-values
may either be attributed to certain assumptions’ being tacitly employed in
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determining the truth-value of the modal claim that are not reflected on the
right-hand side; or attributed to the individual’s making a mistake about
what is compatible with certain assumptions. In the first scenario, the indi-
vidual considering the claim may be analysed as using a MPL′ translation
that features a modal operator OA1, which they mistakenly believe to be cor-
related with a claim about the A2-accessible maximal consistent sets, where
A1 6= A2. This should eliminate any disparity between the truth-values on
the right and left sides: for provided the individual considering the modal
claim is aware of the assumptions they are employing, in addition to being
correct about the possibility or necessity of the embedded claim relative to
the assumptions, then the truth-value they assign to the modal claim on
the left side of the bi-conditional will match the truth-value of the corre-
sponding right side. In §4.2 it was concluded that the truth-value of the
left-hand side of a particular instance of the bi-conditional cannot be deter-
mined subsequently to the truth-value we assign to the right-hand side (the
‘non-arbitrariness’ constraint), and this requirement has been upheld on the
current account. For the assumptions of the individual associated with the
modal claim are now prioritised, rather than the worlds that happen to be
in a given set.
In this subsection, the material-adequacy of the account that has been
developed was argued for. This challenges Lewis’s claim that linguistic er-
satzer accounts that make use of a syntactic definition of ‘consistency’ gen-
erate a chaotic space of worlds. The cost of preserving material-adequacy in
this way is commitment to the idea that something is possible or necessary
only relative to certain assumptions. Rather than merely being a technical
convenience, this appears to accord well with our everyday use of modal
claims.67
To conclude: an account has been proposed in this section that has
been argued to meet the material-adequacy and non-circularity conditions.
The results of §4, if convincing, therefore show that the developed account
is a successful reductive account, according to the definition of §2.1. The
motivation to adopt a successful reductive, linguistic ersatzer account, if one
could be found, was argued for in §3.2. It has just been seen that one can
be found. It follows that we should adopt it.
67See Kratzer (1991). §7 also lends support to this assertion.
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0.5 Extending the Account to Metaphysical Modal
Claims
An idea that might derive from the assumption-relativity of accessibility
relations is that the flavour of modality associated with a modal claim is
related to the type of assumptions employed. For example, the claim that
it is not possible for there to be married bachelors is generally taken to be
an analytic necessity. A necessary truth is typically defined as an instance
of analytic necessity if it holds only by virtue of the meanings of the non-
logical terms involved in the claim. In giving the correct analysis of the
modal claim affirming the possibility of married bachelors in §4.4, only a
meaning postulate about the relevant predicates had to be assumed. We may
therefore identify certain modal claim as analytic on the basis of the contents
of the relevant assumption-sets. Similarly, we might expect that epistemic
modal claims would be issued relative to assumption-sets that include what
some individual takes herself to know, deontic modal claims would be made
relative to assumption-sets that include rules identified by some individual,
and so on. It therefore seems that metaphysical modal claims could also
be characterised on the basis of the contents of the assumption-sets that
constrain their interpretation. This shall be the topic of the curent section.
I shall begin by attempting to handle metaphysical modal claims with-
out modifying the current account (in §5.1), and then by implementing
the minimal modification of introducing constants into the modal predicate
language (in §5.2). Yet in §5.3, it will be found that the only way to ac-
commodate metaphysical modal claims is to implement the more significant
modifictation of postulating that an essentialist predicate appears in the
assumption-sets for such claims. This predicament will then be analysed
further in the following section.
0.5.1 Attempt 1: The Current Account Unmodified
Let us take the metaphysical modal claim ‘It is possible for Adam to have
been a snake’ and see how far the account proposed so far gets us. Given a
suitably related claim in a language of modal predicate logic,68 we have the
68Obviously, the claims ‘It is possible for Adam to have been a snake’ and ‘There is a
man for whom it is possible that he is a snake’ are not equivalent, since the latter but not
the former is true if Noah is possibly a snake. However, at this point there is no clear way
to express predications involving named individauls. Since the former claim entails the




MREL,Γ v (∃x)(Man(x) ∧ ♦A′Snake(x))
⇐⇒ for some x-variant v′ of v at Γ,Γ v′ Man(x) and Γ v′ ♦A′Snake(x)
⇐⇒ there is some ∆ ∈W : ΓRA′∆ and MREL,∆ v′ Snake(x)
The pressing question, then, is what assumptions we should include in A′ if
we want to rule out the metaphysical possibility of a man’s being a snake.
It shall be seen that, within the current system, there are neither non-modal
nor modal expressions that achieve the desired effect.
First consider the assumptions that could be utilised if we uphold the
requirement to exclude modal operators from the assumption set. We might
try to rule out worlds in which a man is a snake as follows:
1. A′ = {(∀x)(Man(x)→ ¬Snake(x))}
Despite this being a reasonable meaning postulate regarding the extensions
of the two predicates, this clearly does not help with the current case: for
our concern is not to rule out worlds in which an individual is simultaneously
a man and a snake. Rather, we wish to impose restrictions on the proper-
ties individuals may have across worlds, and it seems that no non-modal
expression currently available to the account will enable this.
Suppose we instead attempt the following:
2. A′ = {(∀x)(Man(x)→ ¬♦?Snake(x))}
There are two ways of interpreting the modal operator ♦?, and either way
causes trouble for the current account. Firstly, we might take ♦? to be an
absolute possibility operator ♦. But then it turns out that we have a notion
of modal operators that fail to be relative to non-empty assumption-sets,
and this notion is distinct from broad logical consistency (since Snake(x)
clearly does not express a logical contradiction). This is incompatible with
the conclusions I have been arguing for, and is therefore tantamount to
abandoning the current search for a reductive account of metaphysical modal
claims. If, alternatively, we take ♦? to be a relative modal operator, then we
must determine the assumption set to which it is relative. It is clear that, if
we import allusions to other assumption sets A′′ into the assumptions set A′,
then a regress can be obtained: that is, there would be nothing to rule out
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cases where individuals employ an infinite series of assumption-sets, which
never terminates with the assumption-set free of modal operators required
to ground the whole process. If we were to allow modal claims to occur
in A′ that are relative to A′ itself, then the question once more emerges of
what non-modal assumptions we can put into A′ to rule out worlds in which
♦A′Snake(x) holds. The first problem with 2. is therefore that construing
♦? as either an absolute or relative modal operator spells trouble for the
overarching account.
There is a second problem with 2. (in case the first problem does not
seem serious enough): a puzzling sense of triviality arises if modal claims
are allowed to appear in assumption sets. We are assigning a truth-value
to ♦A′Snake(x) on the basis of the presence or absence of an assumption
that ♦?Snake(x). We thereby seem to be assuming the truth or falsity of a
modal claim in order to determine the truth-value of a related modal claim.
This contrasts with the earlier described case, where the truth-value of a
modal claim is determined relative to pre-existing non-modal assumptions.
In light of these issues with 1. and 2., the prospect of extending the de-
veloped account to handle metaphysical modal claims does not look promis-
ing. However, in the following subsections I wish to explore other means of
salvaging the project.
0.5.2 Attempt 2: Introducing Constants into the Account
I take the previous subsection to convincingly demonstrate the reasons that
the restriction against modal claims in the assumption-set must remain.
Yet, as we have seen, this restriction means that de re modal claims, such
as (∃x)(Man(x)∧¬♦A′Snake(x)), cannot be treated identically to de dicto
ones like ¬♦A′(∃x)(Married(x) ∧ Bachelor(x)). Roughly, let us say that
‘A sentence containing a modal operator counts as de re if and only if it
involves either quantification into a modal context or the presence of a rigid
designator within the modal context’.69 Since the modal operator has scope
over the entire formula in the case of de dicto claims, we may delete the
modal operator and rule out worlds in which the embedded non-modal claim
holds through appropriate non-modal assumptions. Yet for de re claims in
which quantifiers out-scope modal operators, we cannot remove the modal
operator without affecting the structure of the modal claim. Moreover,




One might conclude that the language of modal predicate logic should
be extended in order to allow de re claims to be formulated by means of
rigid constants. Let the syntax and semantics of of modal predicate logics
therefore be extended as follows:
1. To the set of terms, add a finite set of constants {c1...cn}.
2. To the set of atomic wffs, add all expressions P (c1...cn) and c1 = cn,
where P is an n-place predicate and c1...cn are individual constants.
3. The interpretation function l is required to assign to each constant c
some a ∈ D(F ), relative to each Γ ∈W .
4. l(c,Γ) = l(c,∆) for all Γ,∆ ∈W .
5. Define the general interpretation function (v ∗ l), such that for a vari-
able x, constant c and world Γ:
(a) (v ∗ l)(x,Γ) = v(x)
(b) (v ∗ l)(c,Γ) = l(c,Γ)
6. Where α is a variable or constant, alter the clauses of the truth-
conditions pertaining to atomic formulas as follows:
(a) MREL,Γ v∗l P (α1...αn) ⇐⇒ 〈(v ∗ l)(α1,Γ)...(v ∗ l)(αn,Γ)〉 ∈ P
(b) MREL,Γ v∗l α1 = αn ⇐⇒ (v ∗ l)(α1,Γ) = (v ∗ l)(αn,Γ)
The general interpretation function is introduced to reflect the fact that
terms are interpreted differently depending on whether they are variables
or constants, with the truth-conditions for atomic formulas then changed
accordingly. The fourth condition stipulates that all constants are rigid, in
the sense that they designate the same individual at every world. Constants
should therefore only be used as translations of proper names within this
system, with definite descriptions’ being expressed through the use of bound
variables and predicates. It should also be noted that, although ‘Adam’
will denote the same individual at every world, the individual it denotes at
some world may lack all of the properties associated with the actual referent
of ‘Adam’. Assumptions will be required to restrict the set of accessible
worlds to those in which the referent of ‘Adam’ possesses particular qualities.
Finally, note that nothing stipulated so far requires it to be the case that
l(c,Γ) ∈ D(Γ).
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Let us now see how the extended language helps the search for suitable
assumptions for metaphysical modal claims. Suppose we try to rule out
worlds in which Adam is a snake as follows:
3. A′ = {(Man(adam)); (∀x)(Man(x)→ ¬Snake(x))}
At first glance, this seems promising: for it looks as if A′ will not be com-
patible with any ∆ such that ¬Snake(adam) ∈ D(∆). However, this is not
so, due to the presence of worlds in which Adam is not a domain-member.
For note that, when l(adam) /∈ D(∆), the quantifiers within the meaning
postulate have no effect on the referent of adam, so A′ allows it to be the
case that (Man(adam)∧Snake(adam)) ∈ ∆; yet this was precisely the for-
mula that we were trying to exclude from the set of accessible worlds when
making such assumptions.
It should be recalled that, in §1.1, varying and constant domain frames
were defined. By considering the possibility of its being the case that
I(c,∆) /∈ D(∆), it has been tacitly assumed that the current account is
compatible with varying domain frames. I will now renounce the tacit tol-
erance of different domain types, and endorse a constant domain framework
for the current account of modal claims. It initially seems counter-intuitive
to hold that everything necessarily exists; however, a predicate ‘Concrete’
may be defined, such that a domain-member is concrete just in case it exists
in an everyday sense of the word. The concrete individuals of the actual
world will be abstract in other scenarios (i.e. those situations in which we
would be tempted to say that they do not exist), and perhaps there are a
host of actually non-concrete objects. It is preferable for technical reasons
to treat non-concrete objects exactly the same as concrete ones, in the sense
that they will be either P or not-P (and not both simultaneously) for every
predicate P.70 Admittedly, my motives for endorsing this constant domain
70This strikes me as the best of three options with regards to predicating properties of
non-concrete individuals. The second option would be to hold that, at worlds at which
Adam is not concrete, then P (adam) /∈ Γ and ¬P (adam) /∈ Γ, for any predicate P (except,
presumably, for the predicate ¬Concrete). The problem with this view is that it violates
maximality, meaning that the construction process for possible worlds needs to be re-
thought. Construing possible worlds as non-maximal consistent sets would result in the
absolute space of worlds being defined far less neatly. The third option would be to hold
that, at worlds at which Adam is not concrete, then P (adam) /∈ Γ but ¬P (adam) ∈ Γ, for
any predicate P . Whilst this view initially seems to be the most intuitively compelling,
it is technically problematic. One issue is that there is no way to syntactically identify
such denials of properties. It would not suffice to allow only those wff in which each
predicate affirmed of Adam is prefixed by a ¬ symbol to occur in Γ, since this would
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perspective are mainly theoretical. However, there are also good philosoph-
ical reasons for adopting a constant domain semantics.71 All of this means
that l(adam) ∈ D(Γ) for all Γ ∈W , and A′ rules out worlds in which Adam
is both a man and a snake in the intended manner.
Yet 3. still does not suffice for current purposes. The problem is that my
account is intended to model the process by which speakers assume certain
facts when issuing modal claims. Yet it is fairly implausible to suppose that
a speaker renders the claim ‘It is impossible for Adam to have been a snake’
true by assuming that ‘Adam is a man’. Some premises appear to be missing,
and such premises should be explicitly included in the assumption-set rather
than being implicitly employed. Furthermore, there are other claims about
the actual properties of Adam that a speaker might assent to the truth of,
such as ‘Adam is bearded’. Yet the speaker need not automatically treat
the metaphysical possibility of Adam’s lacking each property equally. A way
of differentiating between the properties a speaker believes actually hold of
an individual, and those she believes actually hold in a modally significant
way, should therefore be sought. Nevertheless, the introduction of constants
represents progress, since it allows de re modal claims to be targeted by the
assumption set.
0.5.3 Attempt 3: Introducing an Essentialist Predicate into
the Account
Suppose we define an essentialist predicate E, which may prefix an atomic
formula featuring a constant, in order to rule out worlds in which the nega-
tion of that atomic formula holds. The only formal information about its
interpretation will be the following conditional:
E(P (α1...αn))→ P (α1...αn)
where P is an n-place predicate and α1...αn are constants. This tells us, for
permit ¬¬P (adam) to occur in Γ, which entails that P (adam) ∈ Γ. A solution might
be to identify denials of properties semantically, holding that l(adam) /∈ l(P,Γ) for any
predicate P . However, we then get the result that l(adam) /∈ l(Unmarried,Γ). A non-
concrete individual will therefore fail to be in the extension of predicates that already
express the absence of a property, resulting in the truth of counter-intuitive sentences
such as (¬Married(adam)∧¬Unmarried(adam)) (the truth of which surely negates the
fact that the third approach initially seems to be the most intuitive). In light of these
considerations, I would argue that the first option is preferable to the others, since it is
both technically simpler and no less counter-intuitive than them.
71For example, see Williamson (2013).
46
example, that if it is claimed that Adam is essentially a man, then it is being
assumed that Adam is a man. The other direction clearly does not hold,
since the point that emerged from the previous subsection is that affirm-
ing that an individual possesses a particular property is insufficient for this
property to automatically affect the metaphysical claims issued about that
individual. This essentialist predicate could then be used in assumption sets
like so:
4. A′ = {E(Man(adam)); (∀x)(Man(x)→ ¬Snake(x))}
The modal claim MREL,Γ v (∃x)(Man(x) ∧ ♦A′Snake(x)), or the vari-
ant MREL,Γ v ♦A′Snake(adam), will then come out false relative to the
assumption-set A′; for the definition of E ensures that Man(adam) holds at
all A′-accessible worlds, and the constant domain semantics means that the
second formula of A′ excludes worlds at which Snake(adam) is true.
One pressing question is whether the predicate will itself be a symbol of
the modal predicate language MPL′. Initially, consider several reasons to
answer this question negatively: MPL′ is supposed to be first-order, and
introducing a second-order predicate would result in the typical problems
with completeness. Moreover, giving ‘truth-conditions’ for this predicate
merely involves the provision of a conditional, rather than the usual bi-
conditional. Finally, adding it to the language MPL′ would mean that, due
to maximality, each world would have to either include E(P (α1...αn)) or
¬E(P (α1...αn)) as an element for every atomic featuring constants alone.
One consequence of this is that, for each atomic P (α1...αn), we would have
two copies of each world that differ only with regards to the presence of
either the essentialisation of this claim or its negation. Some individuals
might find it counter-intuitive that worlds could be identical with regards to
all facts other than whether or not some property is essential to an individ-
ual. I find this tolerable, but what I find more difficult to tolerate is that the
set representing the actual world would then include either E(P (α1...αn)) or
its negation for each essentialist claim.72 I have some doubts with regards
to the robust thesis that there are objective facts about the properties that
are and are not actually essential to an individual. These considerations
appear to motivate the exclusion of the essentialist predicate from the lan-
guage MPL′. According to this view, the essentialist predicate that may
72I am here presupposing a picture whereby there is a maximal-consistent set that ac-
curately represents the actual world, though only an omniscient creature could determine
which set this is.
47
appear in assumption-sets is ‘special’ insofar as individuals are presupposing
a fact that is not entirely expressible in their language. Given that meta-
physical modal claims are often perceived to be ‘special’ amongst modal
claims, this seems appropriate. Another consequence of this view is that an
assumption-set may now be either consistent or inconsistent with a given
world without being a subset of that world. For if the essentialist predicate
is barred from being an element of worlds, then no assumption-set featuring
it would be a subset of any world. However, this does not appear to be
a significant modification, since consistency and inconsistency continue to
achieve the desired effect. An assumption-set that includes E(P (α1...αn))
will be consistent with any world that excludes ¬(P (α1...αn)) (and hence,
by maximality, includes (P (α1...αn))).
However, suppose that one does not find these considerations particu-
larly compelling. Suppose one thinks that it is acceptable for the language
MPL′ to have a second-order fragment, and that truth-conditions in the
form of a conditional are unusual but not unacceptable; furthermore, sup-
pose one finds the idea that there are objective essentialist facts that hold
at worlds to be intuitively compelling. In this case, one may include the
essentialist predicate in the language MPL′, and continue to uphold the
idea that assumption-sets are subsets of the worlds with which they are
consistent, without causing my account any real trouble.
The proposal, then, is that individuals make assumptions about the
essential properties of individuals when considering metaphysical modal
claims. Suggesting that speakers merely assume that Adam is a man was
held to be implausible. The current suggestion is that speakers assume that
Adam is essentially a man, and rule out worlds in which he fails to be a man
on this basis. Yet there is a significant objection to this proposal: one might
suspect detailed analysis to reveal E to be reducible to modal terms. In
such a scenario, covert modal operators would be appearing in assumption
sets, and the issue of whether such operators are absolute or relative would
merely be obscured by their tacit nature. As explained earlier, the appear-
ance of modal operators in assumption sets (whether absolute or relative)
proves catastrophic for the current reductive approach. It therefore must
be demonstrated that E is not reducible to modal terms. This shall be the
topic of the following section.
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0.6 Accepting E as a Primitive
Having found that we need to endorse an essentialist predicate in the pre-
vious section, the nature of this predicate shall now be determined. In §6.1,
the traditional and Finean perspectives on essentialist predicates will be
discussed. In §6.2, it shall be argued that, as Fine claims, modal terms can-
not be employed to give a reductive definition of this essentialist predicate.
However, in §6.3, I will argue, contra Fine, that an analysis of the essential
predicate in terms of modal expressions will at least be materially-adequate.
The arguments from §6.2 and §6.3 must go through if the essentialist pred-
icate is to allow my account to be extended to metaphysical modal claims.
Finally, in §6.4, I consider the unwelcome consequnces of taking the essen-
tialist predicate as a primitive, and assess the implications for my account.
0.6.1 Essential Properties: Traditional and Finean Accounts
I shall begin by providing some background on essentialism within the liter-
ature. There are several perspectives traditionally adopted towards essential
properties. Aristotelian essentialism is the view that ‘some of the attributes
of a thing . . . may be essential to the thing, and others accidental’.73 We
may further distinguish non-individuating from individuating Aristotelian
essentialism: the former is the view that the only attributes essential to a
particular thing are those that are essential to everything; the latter holds
that some object possesses a set of essential attributes that differs from
those of some other object in the domain, allowing us to individuate the
objects on the basis of their divergent essential properties (though it is left
open whether some objects possess unique individual essences, or whether
essential properties will only ever establish equivalence classes of domain-
members).74 Finally, haecceitism denies that any attributes of any object
are essential to it. An unanalysable essential identity (often construed as a
reflexive identity relation) that does not supervene on properties is instead
postulated.75
Normally, in discussions on the topic of essentialism, metaphysicians
will endorse a particular one of these differing view-points as correct, before
developing an account of which properties are essential to which objects
(assuming they endorse a view other than haecceitism). This contrasts with





expressions (if any) the essentialist predicate correctly applies to. My aim
is to model the process by which metaphysical modal claims are issued
and interpreted. My account therefore accommodates the sorts of claims
made by both essentialists and haecceitists, allowing both sorts of claims
to be true relative to certain assumption-sets.76 That is, if an individual
assumes certain essentialist claims, then only those worlds in which the
relevant properties hold of the objects concerned will be accessible; and if
a haecceitist refrains from assuming any essentialist claims, then worlds in
which diverse properties are attributed to each object will be accessible.
Separate from the question of the essential properties (if any) possessed
by an individual is the question of what it means for a property to be essen-
tial. Traditionally in contemporary analytic philosophy, ‘essential property’
has been defined modally.77 A typical modal definition would be this:
Traditional: P is an essential property of a ⇐⇒ a is necessarily P.78
Such a definition is modal by virtue of including the modal expression nec-
essarily on the right-hand side. Recalling the definition of reduction in §2.1,
this constitutes a reductive definition of ‘essential property’ provided both
the material-adequacy and non-circularity conditions hold.
Recently, however, this modal definition has been challenged. Kit Fine
presents two main arguments against it.79 Firstly, necessary truths that are
entailed by the existence of a particular object will come out as essential prop-
erties of that object, even if they are intuitively unconnected to the nature of
that object. For example, Socrates necessarily belongs to the set whose sole
76Whether there is a particular privileged assumption-set for the analysis of metaphys-
ical modal claims is a question I tackle in §7.
77Fine (1994a), p.3. For example, such a notion of essential properties is assumed in
Marcus (1967) and Kripke (1980).
78Fine also discusses an existentially conditioned variant, ‘P is an essential property of a
⇐⇒ a could not exist without being P ’. The reason I have restricted my attention to the
categorical version is that it makes more sense within the context of the current framework.
In short, if we were to endorse the existentially conditioned variant and interpret ‘exist’
to mean ‘is a domain-member’, then the necessary existence of all entities within this
constant domain system would cause the variant to collapse into the categorical version.
On the other hand, if ‘exist’ were to be interpreted as ‘is concrete’, then the existence
condionalisation is not required due to the fact that the current account allows a to be P
whether or not a is concrete. Assuming that a is essentially P would result in the only
accessible worlds’ being those in which a is P whether or not a is concrete; and if one




member is Socrates if he exists (according to standard views within set the-
ory), so assumed material-adequacy renders ‘Belonging to singleton Socrates
if Socrates exists’ an essential property of Socrates.80 However, ‘Strange as
the literature on personal identity may be, it has never been suggested that
in order to understand the nature of a person one must know to which sets
he belongs.’81 Secondly, every necessary truth will turn out to be an essential
property of any object, even if that object is irrelevant to its obtaining. That
is, in every world in which Socrates exists (in either sense of the word),
nothing is both blue and not-blue. The assumed material-adequacy once
more entails the truth of the left-hand side with the appropriate substitu-
tion. Yet Socrates’ essence seemingly fails to include anything about blue
and not-blue objects, or about non-contradiction in general.
Fine takes these criticisms of the traditional definition of ‘essential prop-
erty’ to motivate the following alternative definition:
Finean: P is an essential property of a ⇐⇒ it helps answer the ques-
tion: ‘What is a?’.82
There are several features that should be noted about this perspective.
Firstly, it suggests that the notion of essence ‘is not to be understood in
modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to a modal
notion.’83 In other words, the reductive definition traditionally attempted
fails. Fine’s two putative counter-examples indicate that he takes it to fail
due to a violation of the material-adequacy condition. That is, the right-
hand side may sometimes be true when the corresponding left-hand side is
false. At the same time, Fine accepts that the left-to-right direction of the
traditional definition holds: that is if P is an essential property of a, then
a could not exist without being P.84 Furthermore, Fine’s perspective ‘sees
real definition rather than de re modality as central to our understanding
of the concept’.85 By ‘real definition’, Fine is referring to our ability to ‘de-
80Fine’s initial formulation of this objection applies to the existentially conditioned
variant, and I have followed his recommendations of how to adapt it to apply to the
categorical version of the traditional view (Fine (1994a) p.6). Of course, there is the








fine an object, or say what it is’.86 He does not go into much detail about
how we define an object (e.g. it is not clear whether an essential property
belongs to an object by virtue of an individual’s definition of that object,
due to a broad consensus regarding the definition of that object, or because
of objective features that are ‘defined’ by being singled out as of impor-
tance); however, he notes that this definition of ‘essential property’ ‘may
not provide us with an analysis of the concept, but it does provide us with
a good model of how the concept works.’87 Finally, he holds that ‘far from
viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity, we should view
metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence ... The metaphysically
necessary truths can then be identified with the propositions which are true
in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever.’88
The key facts that Fine endorses, then, are these:
• i) it is the case that, if P is an essential property of a, then a is
necessarily P ;
• ii) it is not the case that, if a is necessarily P, then P is an essential
property of a;
• iii) P is an essential property of a if and only if it helps answer the
question: ‘What is a?’;
• iv) there is no reductive definition of ‘essential property’;
• v) metaphysical necessity may be reductively defined through making
use of the term ‘essential property’.
0.6.2 Defending the Irreducibility of E to Modal Terms.
As earlier explained, I need to ensure that the essentialist predicate E cannot
be reduced to modal terms, in order to avoid compromising the reductive
aspects of my account. Endorsing Fine’s account of essence would therefore
be extremely useful. My positions on the key facts of his account may be
summarised thus:





• I deny ii);
• I endorse iii), although it has not been ruled out that different individ-
uals may answer the question ‘What is a?’ in different ways, causing
the essential properties of an object to be relativized to individuals’
assumptions;
• I endorse iv), though this will cause an interesting problem later;
• I endorse v), in the sense that metaphysical necessity may be re-
ductively defined partially through making use of the term ‘essential
property’ (in addition to other aspects of the system, such as maximal-
consistent sets and assumption-sets).89
I shall start by discussing my responses to i) and ii). The traditional defini-
tion of ‘essential property’ may be reformulated as follows:
Traditional Reformulated: E(P (α)) ∈ A′ at Γ ⇐⇒ MREL,Γ v∗l
A′P (α)
So far, I have not indicated what it means for an assumption-set A′ to be
at Γ. I will later suggest that assumption-sets are generated by the appli-
cation of a function f to a context (a world-time-individual triple), yielding
the assumptions made by the individual at that time and world.90 It would
therefore make sense to say that A′ is at Γ just in case A′ = f (c) and Γ ∈ c.
Anyway, this reformulation of the traditional definition is just making ex-
plicit the condition required for the right-hand side of my bi-conditional for
metaphysical modal claims to hold:
MREL,Γ v∗l A′P (α)
⇐⇒ for all ∆ ∈ G such that ΓRA′∆ : MREL,∆ v∗l P (α)
(⇐⇒ E(P (α)) ∈ A′ at Γ)
Hence, if the reductive definition of metaphysical modal terms sketched
in §5.3 is to work, both directions of the traditional bi-conditional (re-
formulated) must hold. So Fine’s claim i) needs to be affirmed, but ii) must
89It should be noted that the details of Fine’s account differ drastically from my own.
It is only by phrasing the key aspects of his account in a sufficiently general way that I
am able to agree with it.
90See §7 for further details.
53
be denied. This creates a problem: for it was earlier explained that I have to
show that the essentialist predicate cannot be reduced to modal terms. By
committing myself to the negation of a key aspect of Fine’s account, I would
seem to abandon the potential repair to my system. However, it should be
recalled that there are two ways for a definition to fail to be reductive, and
the possibility of upholding the material-adequacy of the traditional defini-
tion of ‘essential property’, whilst challenging its non-circularity, remains
open. Arguments for the material-adequacy of the modal definition shall be
offered in support of my denial of ii) in the following subsection.
I shall also explain my perspectives regarding iii) - v), in the course of
which I shall argue for the circularity of the traditional modal definition.
Endorsing iii) is useful, since it gives more information about the still mys-
terious essentialist predicate E: individuals in different contexts may find
particular answers to the question ‘What is a?’ salient, and this is a partial
explanation of the essential properties they will assume to hold of an object.
I say it is a partial explanation because iv) claims that Fine’s definition of
‘essential property’ is not reductive. Fine presumably believes his definition
to uphold the material-adequacy condition (unlike the modal definition),
and hence must be assuming that it fails the non-circularity condition. In-
deed, he writes that he doubts ‘whether there exists any explanation of the
notion in fundamentally different terms’.91 Whilst it is difficult to defend
such a strong claim, it can at least be suggested that giving criteria for when
something counts as an answer to the question ‘What is a?’ invokes the es-
sentialist predicate itself. That is, suppose individual S in context c assumes
that Socrates is essentially human, and S justifies this assumption on the
grounds that this constitutes an informative answer to the question ‘What
is Socrates?’ in c. Asking S to explain why this is a reasonable answer in
the context would probably only prompt a response along the lines of: ‘Well,
we say what Socrates is by noting the properties that are constitutive of his
essence’. If this scenario seems plausible, and more informative criteria for
a claim’s counting as an answer to ‘What is a?’ cannot be conceived of,
then there appears to be good evidence to grant that Fine’s definition of
‘essential property’ is circular. It must also be argued that the traditional
modal definition is circular. But this is entailed by an acceptance of v). I
am committed to v) by the observation that my attempted reductive project
is successful if and only if the schema for metaphysical modal claims is re-
ductive. That is, the left-hand side of the following bi-conditional must be
reducible to the right-hand side:
91Fine (1994b) p.53.
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MREL,Γ v∗l A′P (α) ⇐⇒ E(P (α)) ∈ A′ at Γ
But if this is the case, then the left side of the traditional definition cannot
reduce to the right:
E(P (α)) ∈ A′ at Γ ⇐⇒ MREL,Γ v∗l A′P (α)
This is because I have already chosen to endorse the view that the essentialist
predicate is used in a reductive definition of metaphysical modal claims,
meaning the traditional definition violates the non-circularity constraint.92
This completes my arguments for the irreducibility of E to modal terms,
which have involved endorsing aspects of the Finean account. Before leaving
this section, I must defend the denial of the key fact ii) in order to uphold the
material-adequacy of my proposed analysis of metaphysical modal claims. I
shall suggest replies to Fine’s two arguments against the material-adequacy
of the traditional definition. The broader implications of the conclusions
that have been reached so far will then be assessed.
0.6.3 Defending the Material-Adequacy of the Traditional
Definition
Fine’s objections to the standard modal definition of ‘essential property’
focused on cases where certain metaphysical modal necessities putatively
obtain without the related essentialist claim’s obtaining. In short, Fine
presents cases where the right-hand side of a given formulation of the bi-
conditional holds, but the corresponding left-hand side fails to hold. I will
respond to such cases by arguing that the necessity concerned is not in
fact metaphysical necessity. It is therefore incorrect to perceive the relevant
modal claims as instances of the right-hand side of the schema for metaphys-
ical modal claims. It will be useful to recall what I consider a ‘metaphysical
modal claim’ to be: firstly, there was the somewhat hazy definition in the
introduction, where a modal claim is ‘metaphysical’ by virtue of having an
intuitively metaphysical subject matter; secondly, I may now employ the
proposed truth-conditions and hold that a true modal claim is ‘metaphys-
ical’ if and only if either its analysis, or an analysis of its negation that
92I am taking it for granted that definition is a matter of choice, though one must
weigh up the theoretical considerations in favour of reductively defining t in terms of t′
versus reductively defining t′ in terms of t. I shall weigh up such theoretical considerations
towards the end of this section.
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assumes its truth, reveals an assumption-set that contains an essentialist
predicate.93
It might be objected that this response to Fine’s two cases renders the
material-adequacy of the traditional modal definition unfalsifiable, since I
may respond to any accusation of a mismatch between the truth-values
of the left and right sides by concluding that the schema is in fact being
misapplied. However, I think this objection is side-stepped if I am capable
of giving an informative analysis of Fine’s putative metaphysical necessities
in terms of assumption-sets that lack an essentialist predicate; for, after
all, the attempts of doing without the essentialist predicate in analyses of
the irrefutably metaphysical claim ‘It is possible for Adam to have been a
snake’ in §4.1-§4.2 were a resounding failure. I shall therefore proceed with
the described strategy.
Fine’s first objection to the traditional definition was that ‘Belonging
to singleton Socrates if Socrates exists’ counter-intuitively becomes an es-
sential property of Socrates, due to the fact that it holds of him in every
world accessible in a certain context. One way to formalise the supposed
metaphysical modal necessity (assuming we may quantify over sets) would
be:
MREL,Γ v∗l A′(∃s)(∀y)(y ∈ s↔ y = socrates)
The question to be determined is whether this is a metaphysical necessity.
Using the two criteria noted above, I shall reach a negative answer to this
question. Firstly, Fine himself denies that the necessity of the existence
of the singleton Socrates derives purely from Socrates’ nature, and I would
agree; however, I am inclined to use this intuition to bolster a denial that the
93The initial temptation was to say: ‘a modal claim is ‘metaphysical’ if and only if
its analysis reveals an assumption set that contains an essentialist predicate’. However,
this definition would not suffice to identify a haecceitist’s issuing of the claim ‘it is not
possible for Adam to have been a snake’, which she takes to be false, as ‘metaphysical’;
that is, such a claim is false only if the relevant assumption set lacks any essentialist
claim. We would need to consider what assumptions are required to render this claim true
in order to categorise it as ‘metaphysical’ on the basis of the presence of an essentialist
claim. However, it is not sufficient to say ‘a true modal claim is ‘metaphysical’ if and
only if its analysis reveals an assumption set that contains an essentialist predicate’. For
a haecceitist’s claim that ‘it is possible for Adam to have been a snake’ is true only if
his assumption-set lacks an essentialist claim concerning Adam’s being human. Yet we
can guarantee that the negation of this claim, ‘it is not possible for Adam to have been
a snake’, will be true only relative to an assumption-set that includes essentialist claims
about Adam. This is why identifying metaphysical modal claims on the basis of the
assumption of essentialist claims can only be expressed in such an unwieldy manner.
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topic of this claim is ‘metaphysical’, rather than to challenge the traditional
definition of ‘essential property’. Secondly, I do not think that an essen-
tialist predicate unavoidably appears in A′, which means I can attribute
the necessity of the modal claim to another flavour of modality. It seems
that Socrates’ existence should entail the existence of the singleton Socrates
because it is a consequence of the axiom of pairing from Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory that the singleton set {a} exists for any object a.94 Yet the ax-
iom of pairing can obviously be stated without making use of an essentialist
predicate. It therefore seems that the modal claim concerns what we might
refer to as mathematical necessity, since certain mathematical axioms may
be added to an empty assumption-set in order to render the relevant modal
claim true.
Fine’s second objection to the modal definition of ‘essential property’ is
that every absolute necessity (i.e. those truths that hold in every world)
becomes an essential property of any given object, since the truth holds in
every world in which the object exists. We may formulate the sort of claim
Fine has in mind by creating a predicate that reflects such a necessary truth
in order to apply it to Socrates. For example, Fine’s second criticism follows
from the metaphysical necessity of a claim such as:
MREL,Γ v∗l A′ Exists-in-a-world-in-which- ¬(∃y)(P (y) ∧ ¬P (y)) -is-
true (socrates)
or:
MREL,Γ v∗l A′ P-or-not-P(socrates)
Yet both versions of this claim are true relative to an empty assumption
set A′. Moreover, the topic of this claim does not strike me as particularly
metaphysical. Once more, then, this is not a metaphysical modal claim.
In short, using assumption-relative modal operators means that the op-
tion of denying that a particular modal claim is metaphysical can always
be pursued, in order to explain the intuitive falsity of the left side of the
relevant bi-conditional. Provided an assumption-set can be specified that
renders the appropriate modal claim true without the presence of an es-
sentialist predicate, the applicability of the essentialist bi-conditional may
be challenged. For such cases, Fine is correct that the relevant essentialist
claim does not hold, but is incorrect to expect it to be predicted to hold.
94Leung and Chen (1992) p.30.
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Finally, it is clear that this strategy cannot be successfully implemented for
every modal claim, since certain claims can only be analysed through the
use of an assumption-set with an essentialist predicate; these are the meta-
physical modal claims. This completes my argument, contra Fine, for the
material-adequacy of (my formulation of) the traditional modal definition
of ‘essential property’.
0.6.4 The Unwelcome Consequences of Taking E as Primitive
In this section, it has been seen that true modal claims with a metaphys-
ical flavour may be characterised in terms of their relativisation (or the
relativisation of their true negations) to assumption-sets that contain the
essentialist predicate. It was argued that this essentialist predicate may be
understood without invoking modal terms, and that it is itself used in the re-
ductive definition of modal terms. The essentialist predicate must therefore
be endorsed as a primitive.
However, we may now return to the conclusions of §2.3 and ask the ques-
tion of whether this definition increases the likelihood that one will commit
oneself (in the comparative sense) to fewer primitives than any rival. It was
argued that this question was to be answered affirmatively by providing a
reductive definition of modal terms before establishing that this definition
uses non-modal primitive terms that are difficult to reductively define. A
non-modal primitive term was said to be difficult to reductively define if
either no combination of terms can be found that provide a reductive defini-
tion of it, or if it appears to have a good claim to being a plausible primitive;
and evidence for its being difficult to reductively define was said to emerge
if the majority of definers treat it as a primitive.
Let us take stock, then. Firstly, §5.1-§6.3 demonstrated that a reductive
account of metaphysical modal claims is available. To determine whether
this account succeeds in increasing the likelihood of minimising the primi-
tives we (comparatively) commit ourselves to, the difficulty associated with
reductively defining the primitives that we (non-comparatively) commit our-
selves to must be ascertained. These primitives were said to be set, sentence
and E, with the two former already argued to be difficult to reductively de-
fine in §3.3. To argue for a similar conclusion with regards to the latter,
it must be shown that either no reductive account of E is forthcoming, or
that E is a plausible primitive. In §6.1, the traditional definition of ‘essen-
tial’ was described, which gives a reductive definition by employing modal
terms. This means that the most clear evidence for a term’s being diffi-
cult to reductively define is absent (and is in fact contradicted) in this case,
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since the majority of definers have until recently treated ‘essential’ modally.
One criterion for E’s being difficult to reductively define is thus violated,
since some combination of terms has been found that allow a reductive def-
inition to be given. Everything rests on the second criterion, then. Fine
clearly thinks that ‘essential’ is a plausible primitive, and it might therefore
be argued that E meets the criteria for being difficult to reductively define
on the grounds that the second disjunct holds. However, the subjectivity
of the principle of picking plausible primitives now returns with full force.
For advocates of the traditional definition of ‘essential’ presumably endorse
the view that modal terms are difficult to reductively define by virtue of
being plausible primitives, in conflict with the intuitions I confessed to in
§2.1. The answer to the question of whether a reductive definition of modal
terms increases the likelihood of limiting the primitives we commit ourselves
to therefore rests entirely on a criterion which some definers would argue
in fact supports a reductive definition of E that employs modal terms as
primitives.
Eschewing talk of the likelihood of limiting primitives, let us instead com-
pare two particular rival definitions in order to count the primitives that they
(comparatively) commit their definers to. My reductive definition of ‘neces-
sary’95 commits me (non-comparatively) to the primitives set, sentence and
E. The primitivist definition of ‘necessary’ (non-comparatively) commits its
definer to a sole primitive. If we continue to assume that set and sentence
are generally taken as primitives, then the primitivist about modality who
endorses the traditional definition of ‘essential’ (comparatively) commits
himself to the primitives set, sentence and necessary. I am also (compara-
tively) committed to three terms. Disappointingly, the limiting primitives
principle therefore does not adjudicate between the rival accounts.
I would diagnose the situation as follows: individuals who are attempting
a reductive definition of a term t will frequently encounter an unwelcome
primitive t′ in the course of addressing the complexities required to render
their definition functional. This primitive, which was not anticipated when
the reductive project was initially envisaged, causes one’s (comparative)
commitments to sharply rise relative to a definition that employs a reductive
account of the unwelcome primitive. This means that a project that involves
a reductive definition that initially appeared likely to minimise the number
of primitives one (comparatively) committed oneself to ends up faring no
better than a rival account according to the principle of limiting primitives.
95It obviously does not matter which modal term I take as basic, since they are both
definable in terms of the other.
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It has been concluded that there is no objective criterion that will adju-
dicate between a reductive and a primitive definition of ‘necessary’ on the
basis of the number of primitive terms that the definers commit themselves
to. Yet I would argue that this does not nullify the account that has been
described: firstly, it should be noted that the current reductive account is no
worse than a primitive definition of modal terms with respect to the primi-
tives it commits an individual to. In this sense, I have correctly followed the
recommendations of the principle of limiting primitives (as has the modal
primitivist who gives a reductive modal definition of ‘essential’, seemingly).
Secondly, the subjective criterion of picking plausible primitives might cause
an individual to endorse a reductive account of modal terms over a primi-
tive one, on the basis of skepticism about the plausibility of taking the term
‘necessary’ to be immediately understandable. Thirdly, certain theoretical
considerations might weigh in favour of the current account. These could
include the fact that the space of possible worlds is defined with total clar-
ity, that a uniform approach to all modal claims has been sketched or that
the account appears to accurately reflect what is meant by modal claims.
I therefore wish to conclude that this account has provided an analysis of
the meanings and truth-values of metaphysical claims in line with the aims
set out in the introduction; however, objective motivation for this definition
qua reductive account is absent.
0.7 Objections and Replies
There are several objections to the developed account that may well have
become apparent throughout the previous sections. My aim in this final
section is to sketch several available responses to these objections. In many
of my replies, I shall refrain from committing myself to any particular solu-
tion. There are three reasons for this aversion to commitment. Firstly, my
aim continues to be to produce a flexible system that is neutral with regards
to all matters that I can avoid taking a specific perspective on. Secondly,
space limitations mean that I cannot give detailed arguments in support of
particular positions, hence I could not fully justify an endorsement of a po-
sition. Finally, many of the objections can be addressed merely by showing
that several options that are compatible with my account exist, therefore
endorsing one specific option is not required. Having emphasised these im-
portant qualifications regarding my intended aims within this section, I shall
proceed with my responses to the most pressing objections.
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1. This account applies only to simple modal predicate logic
expressions. Can this picture be extended to the modal claims
issued by actual individuals in a more complex natural lan-
guage?
The motivation for attempting to make sense of simple translations of modal
claims was to avoid the complexities afforded by natural language syntax.
Theoretically, there is no reason that the developed account could not be
adapted for (say) modal claims in English. Yet there are practical limita-
tions: the current absence of a grammar that generates all and only the
well-formed strings of English precludes the construction of sets that are
maximal with regards to the sentences of the language. This is why seman-
ticists working on modality would be reluctant to endorse reductive accounts
such as the current one.
However, it is also worth noting that the current account bears a heavy
debt to semanticists’ work on natural language modals. Semanticists do
not consider any natural language modal claims to be ‘absolute’, insofar as
they hold that certain assumptions are operative in each context to restrict
the accessible worlds.96 Hence, whilst attempting to adapt the reductive
aspect of this account to natural languages may result in practical issues,
the non-absolutist aspect of the account is already acknowledged to be a
vital feature of any treatment of natural language modal claims.
2. The account entails several counter-intuitive theses about
the process of issuing modal claims that contradict what we
take ourselves to be doing in issuing such claims. This un-
dermines the account.
In order to address this objection, it makes sense to begin by precisely cate-
gorising the account. Once the most important features have been extracted,
I shall identify which features appear to accord with what we take ourselves
to be doing in issuing modal claims. I will then discuss how to handle the
aspects of the account that do not seem to accord with modal discourse.
The account falls under the following categories:
1. Modal reductivism - Modal terms can be defined through non-modal
terms. Specifically, I employ the primitives ‘set’, ‘sentence’ and ‘es-
sential’ in my reductive definition. This view contrasts with modal
96See Kratzer (1991)
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primitivism, where modal terms are themselves taken as primitives.
2. Modal monism - there is a ‘single, underlying modal notion in terms of
which all others could be defined or understood.’97 Specifically, logical
possibility is used to define an absolute space of worlds, with modal
claims that express other flavours of modality characterised in terms
of subsets of this absolute space. This contrasts with modal pluralism,
where different flavours of modality are interpreted with respect to
disjoint spaces of worlds.
3. Modal factualism - modal claims have truth values. This contrasts with
modal non-factualism, whereby the meanings of modal expressions are
given in non-truth-conditional terms.
4. Modal non-absolutism - modal expressions are always interpreted ‘rel-
ative to contextually determined sets of background assumptions’.98
This is in contrast to modal absolutism, which holds that the truth-
values of modal claims are generally assigned in such a way that only
the world of utterance affects them.
I endorsed modal reductivism on the basis of a general principle that recom-
mends adopting available reductive accounts, in addition to a personal intu-
ition that modal terms are not plausible primitives to endorse. I would not
predict that natural language speakers have intuitions regarding the plausi-
bility of primitive analyses of modal terms whilst immersed in the process
of issuing modal claims. I would therefore deny that modal reductivism is
at odds with speakers’ experiences of modal discourse.
My commitment to modal monism derived from the fact that it is the
most viable way of implementing a reductive account. In short, giving a
reductive definition of all modal terms by employing the same adaptable
apparatus is a more simple strategy than giving distinct reductions of modal
terms that express different flavours of modality. Once more, I do not think
that speakers would tend to have experiences that either accord with or
contradict modal monism, hence I would suggest that speakers’ intuitions
are neutral with regards to modal monism.
Modal reductivism and modal monism do not appear to entail any pre-
dictions about modal discourse that speakers’ experiences could confirm or




account as features that fail to accord with speakers’ intuitions. However,
the matter is less clear-cut for the other two aspects of my account.
Modal factualism was a position I arrived at through tacitly accepting
the assumptions of modal logic and standard formal semantic accounts of
modal terms, within which expressions such as ‘♦φ’ and ‘φ is possible’ are as-
signed truth-conditions and truth-values. It is also the case that the redutive
account I arrived at involved a bi-valent means of rating each modal claim,
depending on membership or non-membership of the non-modal prejacent in
the relevant maximal-consistent sets. Bi-valent systems are obviously nat-
urally extendible to truth-conditional systems. A modal factualist account
makes clear predictions that speakers’ experiences may or may not reflect:
that is, modal claims will be truth-apt. If it is granted that speakers have
differing intuitions about, and responses to, truth-evaluable expressions and
non-truth-evaluable ones, then factualist accounts of modal discourse may be
supported or challenged by speakers’ experiences. The most well-developed
non-factualist accounts treat modal terms as force-modifiers, meaning that
prefixing a non-modal claim with a modal term affects the force with which
the non-modal claim is asserted without causing a new proposition to be
issued. I shall therefore predict and compare the intuitions evoked by: ‘It’s
possible that it is raining’ (an epistemic modal claim) to those evoked by:
‘Speaking frankly, she’s too good for him’99 (an embedded truth-evaluable
claim prefixed by what is clearly a force-modifier). The test assertions will
involve embedding the two claims in expressions for which it is generally
accepted that only claims with truth-values will sound felicitous:
1. ‘If it’s possible that it’s raining, we should bring umbrellas’
2. ‘It’s not the case that it’s possible that it’s raining’
3. ‘Red believes that it’s possible that it’s raining’
4. ‘If speaking frankly she’s too good for him, then she should leave him’
5. ‘It’s not the case that, speaking frankly she’s too good for him’
6. ‘Red believes that speaking frankly she’s too good for him’100
I predict that a speaker would find the first three comments to be acceptable,
and would find the last three unacceptable. Of course, the non-factualist




show that speakers’ experiences of modal discourse do not contradict factu-
alism, since I am not trying to argue for modal factualism on the basis of
intuitions. Provided my predictions of the elicited intuitions are considered
plausible, I conclude that modal factualism’s predictions regarding modal
discourse do not conflict with speakers’ experiences.
Now it remains to consider modal non-absolutism. I arrived at modal
non-absolutism partly by taking seriously the accessibility relations that
are always employed in modal logics and in formal semantic accounts of
modality. Furthermore, it was already mentioned that the simplest way to
implement modal reductivism is to employ a single space of worlds (modal
monism) before singling out different subsets in order to deal with modal
terms of diverse flavours. If these subsets are selected by contexts within
the actual world, rather than depending only on the world of utterance,
then modal non-absolutism results. Like modal factualism, non-absolutism
makes clear predictions that speakers’ experience may or may not reflect:
different tokenings of the same modal claim may take different truth-values
(even if we appropriately alter other indexical terms within such claims),
since they will turn out to employ different assumption-relative accessibility
relations under analysis. This prediction may therefore be tested.
It should be clear that modal absolutism is implausible as a general the-
sis about modal discourse. For it is difficult to see how one could deny that a
modal claim such as ‘It’s not possible for me to go to the party’ can express
different flavours of modality in different contexts, and may take different
truth-values even if the flavour is held fixed. However, this is not to rule out
a version of modal absolutism that occurs only with respect to a subset of the
different flavours of modality. Most plausibly, a selective absolutist would
endorse modal absolutism for metaphysical modal claims alone. Linguists
are often doubtful that the modal claims expressible in natural language
include a class of metaphysical modal claims;101 hence an absolutist about
metaphysical modality would be likely to consider the modal discourse en-
gaged in by metaphysicians to be what challenges the predictions of modal
non-absolutism. And this is the point at which I concede that the current
theory runs counter to the experiences of those immersed in modal discourse:
the non-absolutist aspect of my account contradicts what metaphysicians take
themselves to be doing when engaged in metaphysical modal discourse.
There are two ways in which one might attempt to uphold the current
account in light of this divergence from metaphysicians’ experiences of is-
suing modal claims: one might either present some arguments in support
101Portner (2009) p.133, footnote 2.
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of the idea that metaphysicians who take themselves to be issuing modal
claims with absolute truth-values are just wrong about what they are doing;
or one might leave open the potential for a particular set of assumptions to
be the ‘correct’ set of assumptions for metaphysical modal claims, and say
that the metaphysical modal claims that are true relative to this privileged
set of assumptions hold in a more secure way than other metaphysical modal
claims do. I shall proceed with sketching both strategies.
Firstly, one could challenge the intuitions that metaphysicians have about
the modal claims they make. One might say that, given that either all
or most102 modal claims expressed in natural language are assigned truth-
values relative to restricted sets of possible worlds, it is less likely that
metaphysical modal claims are special than that metaphysicians are mis-
taken about the truth-values of their modal claims. However, this line of
argument is unlikely to impress metaphysicians, since they may well be
convinced that metaphysical modal claims are special. Hence, even if this
first line of argument is compelling for non-metaphysicians, it clearly would
not succeed in easing the metaphysician’s concerns about the non-absolutist
aspects of my account.
A second strategy may therefore be pursused as follows: if the meta-
physician maintains that her modal claims take absolute truth-values, then
we might ask which space of worlds it is that their truth-values are invariably
determined relative to.103 This space would obviously not be the absolute
space defined within my account, since it has already been pointed out that
alleged metaphysical impossibilities do not gain their status by virtue of
expressing logical contradictions. The putative invariant space of worlds for
metaphysical modal claims therefore is not co-extensive with my absolute
space. This space is presumably not broader than my absolute space, un-
less logical contradictions are metaphysically possible. Hence the space of
metaphysically-accessible worlds must be a subset of my absolute space of
worlds. Yet there is great flexibility over the subsets of the absolute space
that the assumption-relative accessibility relations of my system allow to be
selected.104 Therefore, the metaphysician who endorses modal absolutism
102Depending on whether natural language modals can express logical possibility.
103Assuming that the metaphysician is expecting all metaphysical modal claims to be
analysed with respect to the same space, as opposed to merely expecting that all tokenings
of a particular metaphysical modal claim will be analysed by means of the same space.
104Though note that it is not the case that my system allows any subset of worlds to be
selected. To illustrate this point, consider the subset of the absolute space that consists
of only Γ and ∆, where for each φ ∈ Γ, ¬φ ∈ ∆ (and vice versa). No finite, consistent
set of assumptions A would render this subset accessible, since for each ψ ∈ A it cannot
be that ψ ∪ Γ is consistent and that ψ ∪∆ is consistent. An empty assumption-set would
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should have no quarrel with the formal machinery of my account. Rather
than making use of an alternative system that gives a pre-determined space
of metaphysically-accessible worlds, he need only identify the privileged
set of assumptions that yield the invariant set of metaphysically-accessible
worlds within my system. In such a scenario, the stipulation that this set
is the correct one for the interpretation of modal terms expressing a meta-
physical flavour could be added to my account. Then, any individual who
issues a metaphysical modal claim relative to a different assumption-set has
somehow erred. I must confess to doubts about the viability of determining
a set of objective essential properties for an individual, and subsequently
about the plausibility of then postulating the existence of such a set; and
such doubts are precisely why I have described a system that accommodates
the idea that there is no such privileged set of assumptions for metaphysical
modal claims. Of course, my skepticism might prove to be unfounded, and
compelling arguments may be given by modal absolutists for a particular
set of essentialist claims’ being the privileged set.
In summary, I have argued that neither the reductive, monist nor factu-
alist aspects of my account clash with natural language speakers’ intuitions
about modal discourse. The non-absolutist aspect also most likely accords
with speakers’ experiences of modal claims in general, whilst perhaps contra-
dicting the experience of metaphysicians in metaphysical modal discourse. I
am open to the view that such experiences should be deemed mistaken, but
a more convicing argument for metaphysicians holds that absolutism about
metaphysical modal claims is compatible with my account.
3. The account suggests that assumption-sets are personal
choices. But surely there are some constraints that need to
be imposed.
Holding that assumption-sets are fixed through unconstrained personal choice
implies that situations may occur in which an individual assumes that ‘bach-
elor’ means ‘man’, and thereby derives the truth of ‘it is possible for there to
be an unmarried bachelor’. This concern about strange postulates (‘strange’
in the sense of deviating from the sort of things that the majority of indi-
viduals might assume in similar contexts) indicates that more needs to be
said about the content of assumption-sets. Another concern that should be
also not render just this subset accessible, since the absolute space will be accessible in
such a scenario. However, aside from this limitation, it is clear that assumption-sets can
be formed that allow a diverse array of subsets of the absolute space to be selected.
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addressed involves irrelevant assumptions. That is, it seems preferable to
deny that an individual immersed in a discussion about bachelors assumes
anything about Adam’s essential properties, since we would otherwise leave
open the potential for assumption-sets’ being so large that it becomes im-
plausible to postulate that an individual bears a relationship (whether the
relationship consists of representing that set or something else) to such a
set. In order to deal with both concerns, I shall sketch some constraints on
the content of assumption-sets.
I am going to suggest that an assumption-set consists only of an agent’s
beliefs about items related to the question under discussion. Of course,
there is a lot of debate within philosopy about the nature of beliefs, but I
need only assume that they have propositional content which is formulable
within the language of elements of assumption-sets. The term ‘question
under discussion’ refers to the question that is explicitly or implicitly being
discussed in the conversational context.105 This notion derives from an
area of semantics in which it is held that ‘discourses are structured around
questions. It would of course be maximally useful to have an answer to the
Big Question —What is the Way Things Are?— but this question is rather
unmanageable. Instead, speakers adopt strategies for inquiry that involve
dividing the Big Question into smaller questions which are more tractable
and more directly relevant to current purposes.’106 Let us say that the items
related to the question under discussion include all terms within the question
under discussion, all synonyms of those terms,107 and all objects referred to
by the terms or their synonyms.
This addresses the concern about irrelevant assumptions by entailing
that an agent will stand in a relation to a fairly tractable assumption-set,
since only her beliefs about the terms employed and objects alluded to in
the topic under discussion shall enter into the assumption-set that constrains
modal claims within that context. A consequence of this is that, if the ques-
tion under discussion concerns Adam’s being a snake, then meaning pos-
tulates about bachelors will not be relevant; hence, amongst the accessible
worlds that are compatible with assumptions concerning Adam and snakes,
there will be worlds in which married bachelors exist. If one considers this
problematic, then one might stipulate that there are certain assumptions
that are relevant whatever question is being discussed. Recall how it was
mentioned in §4.4 that I would have no complaint about a set of ever-present
105See Roberts (1996).
106Lassiter (2011), p115.
107See §2.3 for a rough characterisation of synonymy in terms of the ordering relation an
individual uses to define the terms of their language.
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assumptions’ being specified. As earlier noted, generating the particular as-
sumptions for inclusion in this set will be a significant challenge. It will also
be a difficult balancing act to ensure that the set of ever-present assump-
tions is sufficiently large to rule out unwelcome worlds at the same time as
being sufficiently small as to be tractable. The presence of these two chal-
lenges might provide motivation to deny the existence of any ever-present
assumptions, thereby conceding that there will be some accessible worlds
that represent bizarre facts. Such bizarre facts would be unrelated to the
topic under consideration so could be safely ignored. My preference would
be to accept this motivation and avoid the difficulties associated with postu-
lating ever-present assumptions; though either approach could be adopted
to render assumption-sets finite.
The concern about strange postulates is addressed as follows: if an agent
is under the mistaken impression that ‘bachelor’ means ‘man’, then this
would be the only meaning postulate about the term ‘bachelor’ that would
appear in his assumption-set when the topic under discussion involves bach-
elors. Once it becomes apparent to other individuals engaged in the conver-
sation that the agent is making such an assumption (for example, if the agent
says ‘It’s possible for there to be married bachelors’, which would be true
relative to her assumption-set), they might point out that he is assuming
something that they consider strange. On the other hand, an individual who
believes that ‘bachelor’ means ‘unmarried man’ may not omit this assump-
tion when it is relevant to the topic that is being discussed. If an individual
who knows perfectly well what ‘bachelor’ is generally taken to mean insists
on telling someone ‘It’s possible for there to be married bachelors’ out of
perversity, then he would be saying something that is false relative to his
assumption-set. In short, individuals make strange assumptions if that is
what they genuinely believe, and certain strange modal claims will then be
true relative to those assumptions. There may be ways to convince agents
that their assumptions are strange, and it could perhaps be said that modal
claims which are true relative to strange assumption-sets possess a defect
lacked by modal claims which are true relative to less strange assumption-
sets. Yet an agent is barred from making assumptions that they believe to
be false, other than in the context of a counterfactual conditional.108
In conclusion, I am able to say a little more about the content of assumption-
sets in order to ease concerns about strange postulates and irrelevant as-
108I would argue it is the very fact that individuals normally assume things they take to
be true that leads to the requirement to explicitly state counterfactual assumptions in the
form of antecedents (e.g. ‘If bachelor’ meant ‘man’, then it would be possible for there to
be married bachelors’).
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sumptions. This has been a very rough sketch of the relation between
assumption-sets, beliefs and questions under discussion; and a more detailed
treatment of the topic may or may not reveal problems with the approach.
4. When one agent issues a modal claim and another agent
considers it, just whose assumption-set is the second agent
employing?
As of yet, I have not explained how relative accessibility relations are selected
in particular contexts. This means that, although my account predicts the
truth-value of a modal claim relative to specific assumption-sets, it does
not predict which assumption-set is operative in a given context. I need to
define a function f from contexts (understood as world, time, agent triples)
to the assumption-sets operative in those contexts. This function would be
triggered by the occurrence of a modal term at that context (which has
been signified in the preceding account through prefixing the modal terms
by a subscript referring to the assumption-set that they are relative to).
The set of accessible worlds would then be generated by applying a relative
accessibility function to that relevant assumption-set, in order to yield a
relative accessibility relation. Yet even after defining this function f, it does
not automatically follow from the fact that a modal claim is uttered at a
context c that the relative accessibillity relation relevant to its interpretation
is generated by applying f to c. It remains to be determined whether my
assumption-sets should be generated within a contextualist framework, a
relativist framework, or another one altogether. I shall begin by summarising
the debate between the proponents of the traditional contextualism and the
more recent relativism with regards to epistemic modals, before tentatively
taking a position on the matter.
The traditional approach within formal semantics is to empahsise the
context of utterance (a world, time, individual triple at which a claim is
issued) as the determiner of the space of accessible worlds.109 That is, for an
epistemic modal claim, the accessible worlds are those compatible with the
knowledge of some individual or group at the context in which the claim is
issued; for a deontic modal claim, the accessible worlds are those compatible
with the relevant rules operative at the context of utterance, and so on. On
this view, a modal claim expresses a particular propostion once it is uttered
in a context, since an assumption-set relevant to the claim’s interpretation
109For example, see Kratzer (1991)
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must be identified for it to possess content.110
Yet it has been argued (for example, in MacFarlane (2011)) that the
entire spectrum of contextualist views demonstrably fail to predict the cor-
rect truth-conditions for epistemic modals. The data used to motivate this
perspective typically consists of either ‘eavesdropping’, ‘retraction’ or ‘dis-
agreement’ cases. The following is an example of an ‘eavesdropping’ case:
suppose Prim is looking for Red, and Prim says to a conveniently located
by-stander ‘It’s possible that Red’s outside’. Red, who is hiding behind
the curtains, overhears this conversation and mutters to herself ‘What Prim
said is false’. Someone who is wanting to argue against contextualism hopes
that those who hear this scenario will have two intuitions about the case:
firstly, that Prim spoke appropriately in uttering the modal claim and, sec-
ondly, that Red also spoke appropriately in her judgement of the claim as
false. It is then argued that contextualists cannot accommodate both intu-
itions. This is the case because a version of contextualism that takes Prim’s
knowledge to determine the accessible worlds relevant to the interpretation
of her claim cannot accommodate the second putative intuition; for Red’s
claim is neither appropriate in the strong sense of being true (for since it is
true that Red’s being outside is compatible with Prim’s knowledge, Prim’s
modal claim is true, so Red’s assertion that Prim’s claim is false must it-
self be false), nor in the weak sense of being a justified utterance in the
context (since an eavesdropper seemingly has no business commenting on
the knowledge of another individual, since she is not immersed in a con-
versation with that individual). Moreover, a version of contextualism that
takes Prim and Red’s knowledge to determine the accessible worlds relevant
to the interpretation of Prim’s claim (on the grounds that Red’s presence,
even unbeknownst to Prim, makes her a participant in the conversation)
cannot accommodate the first putative intuition; for Prim’s claim is then
neither appropriate in the strong sense (since it is false that it is compatible
with both Prim and Red’s knowledge that Red is outside) nor in the weak
sense (since Prim is surely not justified in speculating about the knowledge
states of all individuals and potential eavesdroppers in the vicinity).111
Relativist perspectives are inspired by taking the intuitions evoked by
‘eavesdropping’ cases seriously, at the same time as assuming the strong
interpretation of appropriateness. This leads to an account according to
110I have been trying to avoid talk of propositions in the preceding sections, in order
to simplify matters. Yet it is important to resort to such talk now in order to clarify




which Prim’s modal claim expresses a single proposition which is both true-
for-Prim and false-for-Red.112 Where contextualism assumed that tokenings
of modal claims take a single truth-value at a world, fixed by factors asso-
ciated with the context of utterance, relativism therefore allows a single
utterance of a modal sentence to take diverse truth-values within a single
world relative to different contexts of assessment (world, time, individual
triples at which a claim is judged).113 Standard relativism holds that it is
always the assumptions of the individual who is part of a particular context
of assessment that determine the interpretation of the modal claim at that
context. Relativists hold that Red’s muttering ‘What Prim said is false’ is
appropriate (in both senses) because what Prim said is indeed false, relative
to Red’s knowledge at the world and time at which she assesses the claim;
and Prim’s initial utterance is appropriate because it is true when assessed
relative to the context in which she utters it.
This is a highly complex area of debate. In fact, recent experimental
data suggests that individuals’ semantic intuitions about epistemic modal
discourse do not fit neatly within either a contextualist or relativist frame-
work.114 My inclination is therefore to avoid committing myself to any
position on the matter, at least until further data about speakers’ semantic
intuitions surrounding modal discourse is collected. However, I am aware
that this results in my account’s failing to generate any predictions whatso-
ever about the truth-values of particular modal utterances. In light of this
fact, I shall very tentatively endorse a position on the matter. It is preferable
to select the most flexible position available, in order to allow my account
to accommodate the unpredictable semantic intuitions evoked by even the
most creative ‘eavesdropping’, ‘retraction’ and ‘disagreement’ cases. With
this aim in mind, I will tentatively endorse flexible relativism. For epistemic
modals, this view holds that ‘whose knowledge is relevant to the evaluation
of epistemic modals is itself determined by features of the context of assess-
ment’.115 Thus it is being suggested that, for all modal terms that occur
without an explicit restricting phrase, pragmatic factors surrounding the
context of assessment determine the assumption-set that the relative acces-
sibility function is applied to. Flexible relativism may agree with standard
relativism that, in general, an individual at a context of assessment selects
112This is obviously a special sort of proposition, since propositions are not normally
construed as entities that may be assigned different truth-values at different contexts of
assessment.
113MacFarlane (2011) p.159.
114Knobe and Yalcin (2013) pp.15-6
115MacFarlane (2011) pp. 175-6.
71
an assumption-set consisting of their own beliefs relevant to the topic at
hand to interpret a modal claim. However, flexible relativism permits the
individual at a context of assessment to occasionally select someone else’s
assumption-set, or the assumption-set consisting of the union of her own
relevant beliefs and someone else’s, in order to fix the space of accessible
worlds. This would presumably be triggered by the question under discus-
sion at that individual’s context of assessment. For example, if the question
that is implicitly being discussed at Red’s context of assessment is whether
Prim was justified in issuing her intial utterance of ‘It’s possible that it’s
raining’, then Red might select Prim’s own assumption-set at Prim’s context
of utterance to assess the modal claim, to the best of her abilities.116 Of
course, in most scenarios the implicit question under discussion would be
said to consist of the truth of Prim’s initial utterance of ‘It’s possible that
it’s raining’, in which case Red will employ her own assumptions against
which to test Prim’s claim.
A limitation often noted for flexible relativism is that it makes minimal
predictions for the truth-values of modal claims relative to particular con-
text of assessment. However, it is certainly preferable for me to employ an
account of assumption-set selection that makes minimal predictions than for
me to refrain from employing an account at all, thereby making no predic-
tions for the truth-values of modal claims. Whilst the flexibility of flexible
relativism means that the truth-values assigned to modal claims at partic-
ular contexts of assessment cannot reliably be predicted, this is a normal
feature of accounts of linguistic phenomena that postulate a significant role
for pragmatics. Moreover, this flexibility is precisely what accommodates
the unexpected intuitions that have emerged from recent data, since flexible
relativism anticipates that speakers will be unable to reliably discern from
an abstract consideration of a case the assumption-set that is fixed by the
context of assessment within that particular case. Lastly, I shall reiterate
that my endorsement of any position on this complex matter is reluctant,
and the general account described throughout the previous sections may be
adapted for any version of contextualism or relativism should compelling
data arise in support of that version.
116It has already been shown that relativists partially motivate their position by pointing
out the implausibility of individuals’ reliably utilisting other people’s assumption-sets, due
to the inaccessibility of others’ mental states (i.e. recall that it was said that neither Prim
nor Red should be expected to employ each others’ knowledge when issuing or assessing
epistemic modal claims in the ‘eavesdropping’ case). This is why the flexible relativist must
say that the individual at a context of assessment would utilise someone else’s assumption-
set only rarely, and that she does this only to the best of her abilities.
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5.Relativist theories of metaphysical modal discourse are un-
warranted, since the type of ‘eavesdropping’ cases that typ-
ically motivate relativism with regards to epistemic modal
claims do not sound compelling when constructed for meta-
physical modal claims.
For me, the motivation for endorsing relativism for metaphysical modal
claims would not derive from a consideration of ‘eavesdropping’, ‘disagree-
ment’ and ‘retraction’ cases constructed with metaphysical modal claims.
Rather, my account predicts that the flavour of modal claims is determined
by the type of assumptions included in the assumption-set. Hence the con-
text that determines the relevant assumption-set also determines the flavour
of modality. Therefore, if relativism is endorsed for some flavour of modal
claims, it must be endorsed for all flavours. In other words, it would not
make sense to hold that an epistemic modal claim has the relevant assump-
tions determined by contexts of assessment whereas a metaphysical modal
claim has the relevant assumptions determined by the context of utterance.
This is the case because the flavour of the modal claim is not itself decided
until the assumption-set is fixed.
Yet it might be argued that, if a consideration of ‘eavesdropping’ scenar-
ios reveals the predictions of flexible relativism to be unintuitive, then this
would count against the current proposal. For several reasons, I think it is
difficult to argue that the relativist’s prediction clashes with the intuitions
one would expect a natural language speaker to have about such scenarios:
firstly, if one were to claim that there is something deviant about the rela-
tivist’s reading of the case, then this sense of deviance could be attributed
to the rarity of such metaphysical modal claims in everyday discourse. In
short, the fact that such claims are not usually discussed outside of phi-
losophy departments might cause the mere description of this case to seem
‘weird’, resulting in a sense that any predictions of the semantic intuitions
evoked by the case are inaccurate. Secondly, the metaphysician is free to
specify some ‘correct’ assumptions about the essential features of individ-
uals, before holding that an individual at a context of assessment should
aim to deploy one of these privileged assumption-sets when considering a
modal claim that they interpret as having a metaphysical flavour (at least
if the question under discussion is the truth of that claim). Then, even if
predictions that both Prim and Red are speaking appropriately in their rival
truth-assignations to the same claim seem counter-intuitive, this could be
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attributed to the fact that only one of them can be deploying the privileged
assumption-set that lends their interpretations of modal claims additional
security. I would therefore argue that ‘eavesdropping’ cases do not provide
good evidence against relativist approaches to metaphysial modal claims.
6. We often have a sense that a genuine disagreement over
a modal claim is occurring. Does this account preserve dis-
agreement?
Contextualism and relativism give different accounts of disagreements within
modal discourse. I shall describe the main features of each sort of account
before considering whether they accord with our intuitions about modal
discussions.
It is first worth clarifying what it means for something to be a ‘genuine
disagreement’. This is surprisingly difficult to define,117 but restricting my
focus to claims for which the only context-dependent term is a modal oper-
ator simplifies the process. For current purposes, I will therefore say that a
‘disagreement’ is any situation in which there are at least two participants
who believe that they are attributing conflicting truth-values to the same
proposition at the same time and world; and a disagreement is ‘genuine’
if they are indeed attributing conflicting truth-values to the same proposi-
tion in this way. It is difficult to give extensive criteria of individuation for
propositions. Yet in the case of modal claims, it seems that analysis must
at least reveal identical relative modal operators.
Cases in which one individual affirms, and the other denies, a modal
claim that is interpreted relative to their mutual assumption-set are not the
concern of the current discussion. The reason for this is that such cases
are unproblematic for both contextualists and relativists: disagreement is
genuine (in the sense that the exact same proposition is being targeted by
the affirmation and denial), and only one judgement of the modal claim
is accurate since one of the individuals has clearly miscalculated what is
consistent with the assumption-set. The type of disagreement cases that
concern us are those in which individuals are seemingly employing different
assumption-sets in reaching their judgements of a modal claim. Let the fol-
lowing scenario be the target of the current discussion:
Prim: ‘It’s possible that it’s raining’
117MacFarlane (2007) pp.22-5.
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Red : ‘That’s false’118
There are two ways in which a contextualist can interpret such an exchange
in order to attempt to preserve disagreement. Firstly, the contextualist
might say that the response involves Red implicitly issuing another modal
claim (‘It’s not possible that it’s raining’) which is interpreted relative to
the assumption-set operative at the context at which she utters it. If this
assumption-set includes an assumption that it is raining, then the new modal
claim uttered by Red is true, even if Prim’s initial claim was also true
relative to her own assumption-set at the context of utterance. This first
contextualist perspective therefore indicates that both participants in modal
disputes may speak truthfully if they are using distinct assumption-sets.
However, this perspective also implies that they are ultimately talking past
each other, in the sense that the affirmation and denial are actually targeting
modal claims that express different propositions. They are therefore not
immersed in a genuine disagreement. Moreover, it has to postulate implicitly
expressed modal claims when the form of the denial mirrors Red’s response.
It might be considered implausible to suggest that asserting ‘That’s false’ is
elliptical for ‘It’s not possible that it’s raining’.
The second contextualist perspective takes an identical position to the
first perspective with regards to responses that include an explicitly stated
modal claim. However, it rejects the notion of implicitly issued modal claims,
thereby construing Red’s response differently. The response is taken at face
value, and interpreted as attributing a particular truth-value to the very
modal claim uttered by the Prim. This perspective therefore precludes the
affirmer and denier from both speaking truthfully, since either Prim or Red
is correct about the compatibility of rain with the assumption-set opera-
tive at Prim’s context of utterance. Unlike the previous contextualist view,
this reading of the case indicates that both individuals are targeting the
same proposition, and hence are in genuine disagreement. Whilst implic-
itly uttered modal claims are no longer postulated, it may now be seen as
problematic that the related response ‘It’s not possible that it’s raining’ is
treated so differently to the response ‘That’s false’. Moreover, in cases where
an individual responds by saying ‘That’s false, it’s not possible that it’s rain-
ing’ or ‘That’s not possible’, it is not obvious which of the two treatments
would be proposed.
118To assuage a concern that the ‘That’ of ‘That’s false’ might be targeting the prejacent
rather than the entire modal claim, bear in mind that Red’s asserting ‘That’s false, it’s
not possible that it’s raining’ would seem to be an equally appropriate response.
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In contrast to the second contextualist response, relativism allows both
Prim and Red to be speaking truthfully, since Prim’s modal claim may well
be true when considered from a context of assessment that is identical to the
context in which she uttered it, whereas it will be false relative to Red’s con-
text of assessment if she employs an assumption-set that precludes it. Yet
unlike the first contextualist response, a genuine disagreement is occurring,
since the affirmer and denier are targeting the assessment-sensitive propo-
sition expressed by the initial modal claim. Of course, an impression might
remain that the disagreement posited by relativists is insubstantial, since it
could easily be resolved if it were to be made apparent that the participants
were employing different assumption-sets. Why, then, would participants
in such disputes continue to disagree if they are assuming different things?
MacFarlane suggests an explanation of the purpose of such disagreements,
uniquely available to the relativist:
‘Assessment-sensitive expressions are designed, it seems, to foster con-
troversy, where use-sensitive expressions preclude it. But what is the
point of fostering controversy in “subjective” domains, if there is no
(nonrelative) truth on which both parties can converge? Why shouldn’t
we just talk about our own tastes, rather than ascribing subjective
properties to the objects? Perhaps the point is to bring about agree-
ment by leading our interlocutors into relevantly different contexts of
assessment.’119
A relativist could therefore develop this idea in order to address the concern
that modal disagreements end up looking somewhat futile.
It can thus be seen that, on one contextualist view, genuine disagreement
is preserved (although if Red says ‘It’s not possible that it’s raining’ instead
of ‘That’s false’, the disagreement is no longer genuine); and according to
the relativist’s account, genuine disagreement occurs (whatever form Red
uses to express her denial of Prim’s utterance). The choice between the two
accounts, with regards to the matter of disagreement, therefore depends on
whether or not it is perceived to be desirable for the participants who are in
dispute over a modal claim to both speak truthfully. Nevertheless, it does




7. The problem of defining a ‘sentence’ of the world-making
language is an insuperable objection traditionally raised against
linguistic ersatzism, which undermines the current account.
In order to address this concern, I intend to describe some available re-
sponses, in order to provide evidence that this objection is not ‘insuperable’.
I shall not endorse any particular response, for the three reasons detailed in
the introduction to this section.
The problem alluded to is the following: if we take ‘sentence’ to mean
‘sentence-token’ (i.e. sentences that have been or will be actually uttered
or inscribed), then we have an insufficient number of sentences to express
all possibilities; since, for example, ‘there is a noncountable infinity of real
numbers, and we will need a sentence for each, specifying that the number
in question exists; . . . but there are only countably many sentence-tokens,
each finite in length, so not even that part of the actual world consisting in
the existence of the real numbers can be expressed by sets of sentences in
the sense of tokens.’120 We obviously cannot make use of possible sentence-
tokens if we are seeking a non-circular account of modality. Relying on
sentence-types is also problematic, for then ‘the appeal to sentence-types is
too close to the appeal to abstract entities of an intensional or modal sort
to conform to the non-modalist’s avowed program of reducing the modal to
the nonmodal’.121 The objection is therefore that the reductivist linguistic
ersatzer cannot give a coherent definition of ‘sentence’.
One option that many linguistic ersatzers have resorted to is to con-
struct worlds from a Lagadonian language, whereby domain-members and
properties denote themselves. ‘On one Lagadonian scheme, each object is
allowed to function as its own name, and each universal as its own predi-
cate; sentences are set-theoretic constructions out of this “vocabulary” along
with logical connectives and quantifiers. Notice that on this Lagadonian ac-
count, there are words and sentences corresponding to nothing ever spoken
or contemplated by a human speaker.’122 This approach solves the current
problem because it can be guaranteed that there will be some actual La-
gadonian sentence-token to represent every aspect of the actual world. A
commonly noted objection to this response is that a Lagadonian language
will only contain names for actual individuals, hence it is not clear how pos-
sibilities involving non-actual individuals would be represented. However,





tial solution to this concern, since non-concrete individuals are nevertheless
domain-members at the actual world, thus their names should end up in
the Lagadonian language. A second concern about employing a Lagadonian
language is that a set-theoretic paradox seemingly results: ‘from the assump-
tion that there is a maximal set of sentences, set theory yields the powerset
of the set of all sentences; the language then yields a sentence corresponding
to each element of that set – with the absurd result that there are more sen-
tences than are in the set of all sentences.’123 This paradox directly results
from the fact that a Lagadonian language is stipulated to contain a name
for every object (i.e. the object itself), and there must therefore be a name
for each subset of sentences of the language. One solution would therefore
be to stipulate that the Lagadonian language does not contain names for
objects that are already sentences of the language, though this might harm
the expressivity of the language.
An alternative response to this first problem would be to construct worlds
from the sentence-tokens expressible within a logical or natural language,
but define the set of all such sentences by providing a grammar for that
language. For such an account, ‘expressible’ would not be a primitive modal
term; for a listing of all sentence-tokens could be generated from the gram-
mar if one had an infinite amount of time. Providing such a grammar for
a natural language is clearly a significant challenge. However, a linguistic
ersatzer may choose to construct worlds from translations of natural lan-
guage claims within a less expressive language for which a grammar may be
provided (much like the approach within the preceding sections). I would
therefore argue that this problem for linguistic ersatzism is not insuperable,
since multiple solutions exist.
8. Nothing has yet been said about how this account would
handle generalised de re metaphysical modal claims such as
‘All humans are necessarily human’.
The essentialist predicate has been defined in such a way that it may only ap-
ply to constants, hence it is not immediately apparent how it would apply to
quantified expressions in generalised de re metaphysical modal claims. One
solution that springs to mind would be to translate expressions such as ‘hu-
man’ as an individual constant in these situations, so that essentialist claims
may be formed within assumption-sets by prefixing the translation with the
123Roy (1995) p.221.
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essentialist predicate. These terms may then be treated as rigid constants
that denote the appropriate set of individuals at a particular world and track
this set across worlds. Without the appropriate essentialist assumptions, the
individuals within this set will in some worlds lack the properties that serve
as membership criteria in the original world. For example, we could name
the set of all humans at the actual world ‘bob’. There will be some worlds in
which the extension of the set ‘bob’ at that world includes individuals with
the properties of goldfish and pencils and numbers. In fact, in each world in
which Adam is a snake, ‘bob’ will include at least one snake in its extension.
If our assumption-set A contains the essentialist claim: E(Human(bob))
then, in every A-accessible world, the set bob would be identical with the
set of all humans at that world. These ideas are clearly under-developed.
A two-dimensional semantic framework would provide clarification, in order
to distinguish between the set of individuals actually denoted by ‘human’ as
it appears in other worlds (i.e. bob) and the set of individuals denoted by
‘human’ in those other worlds (i.e. the individuals with human properties
at each world). Furthermore, I believe a nominalizing operator, which ap-
plies to predicative expressions to convert them to singular terms, could be
useful.124 Adapting the account to handle generalised de re metaphysical
modal claims therefore does not appear to be an insuperable challenge.
9. The account suggests that we consider an infinite num-
ber of infinite sets in determining whether or not our modal
claim is true relative to our assumptions, which is implau-
sible.
It is first worth noting that the intractability of an infinite number of in-
finite possible worlds is an issue faced by anyone making use of possible
world semantics (either for modal expressions or for other natural language
phenomena). However, responding to a criticism by pointing out that it is
not unique to the endorsed account is clearly insufficient. I shall therefore
try to assuage this concern in a more informative manner.
The notion of a partial world may be defined, to allow us to claim that
structures that are less unwieldy than maximal-consistent sets are repre-
sented by those individuals who are considering a modal claim. A partial
world is a non-maximal, consistent, finite set of wff. Given the earlier result
that proved that every non-maximal consistent set can be extended to a
maximal-consistent set for a given language (see §4.1), it follows that every
124See Chierchia (1985).
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partial world can be extended to a possible world. The idea is that, having
marked out a formula (or set of formulas) P as relevant, we should be able
to restrict our focus to certain other wffs. This means that, firstly, we only
want to include the relevant P and its relevant implications in a partial
world; and, secondly, we want to derive a model consisting of partial worlds
that demonstrate all consistent alternative assignments of truth-value to P
and its relevant implications in the form of a set of partial worlds. The set
of relevant formulas P would normally be the union of the assumption-set
A operative in that context and the modal claim φ under consideration.
The technical details of this process shall not be covered due to space con-
straints.125 However, the basic idea is that a set S is defined, which gives
the closure of P under its subformulas, in addition to the closure of P ’s
subformulas under single negation. S therefore gives the relevant implica-
tions of a given formula P, restricting the focus to a finite set of implications
that pertain only to the atomics of that relevant formula (achieved by iden-
tifying the subformulas of P); and S also gives the alternatives to P and
its relevant implications, by including the different truth-values that can be
assigned to the relevant formulas and implications (achieved by identifying
the negations).
We may then construct equivalence relations on W as follows: for any
Γ,∆ ∈ W , Γ ∼S ∆ iff ∀p ∈ S : M,Γ v∗I p ↔ ∆ v∗I p. That is, an
equivalence relation holds between two worlds if and only if the elements
of S true at each of those worlds are identical under the same valuation of
variables and interpretation of constants. We then define the equivalence
class of Γ, such that [Γ] = {∆ ∈ W : Γ ∼S ∆}. Each equivalence class may
be construed as a partial world, since it only assigns truth-values to the set
of relevant wffs P, and relevant implications of P.
We may then define partial models PMS (models consisting of partial
worlds, derived from imposing equivalence classes on a non-partial model M
in the described way relative to a set of wffs S ). We call PMS a filtration
of a model M relative to S iff, for all formulas p ∈ S and all Γ ∈ W ,
PMS , [Γ] v∗I p ↔ M,Γ v∗I p. All of this ensures that there is a partial
model PMS containing a single partial world pw for each equivalence class
derived from M, where only the wffs of S are assigned truth-values. The
truth-conditions for modal claims may then be adapted for these partial
models, which allows it to be postulated that individuals only consider a
125For more technical details, see Blackburn et al. (2006) pp. 267-8; and Gabbay (1972).
Bear in mind that filtration is normally used to prove decidability for modal logics, and I
have adapted it for current purposes.
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finite number of non-maximal, consistent partial worlds in assigning a truth-
value to a modal claim.
This appears to successfully deal with the current objection. It is also
worth noting that partial worlds may be used to address the limitation
associated with the narrow construal of the relevant assumptions, discussed
in the response to Question 3. That is, although some of the non-partial
worlds accessible from a context in which the question under discussion
concerns Adam and snakes will feature married bachelors, the accessible
partial worlds will not features such bizarre entities, due to the fact that
claims about bachelors will not receive truth-values at such partial worlds if
those claims are not relevant in the context.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have developed a reductive account of metaphysical modal
claims. It has been argued that a metaphysical modal claim is true iff there
is a maximal-consistent set of sentences compatible with the contextually-
determined assumptions, with essentialist claims playing a significant role in
these assumption-sets. In §2, a reductive definition of ‘possible world’ was
said to be one that was both non-circular and materially-adequate. The
motivation for a reductive account was then found to derive from a limiting
primitives principle. An initial problem was establishing a means to tally up
the primitives that one’s definition commits one to in a comparative sense.
As a solution, it was said that one increases the likelihood of minimising
the primitives one is (comparatively) committed by giving a reductive def-
inition that employs only primitives that are difficult to reductively define
themselves. §3 involved the development of an argument that only linguistic
ersatzer accounts have the potential to be reductive. The section concluded
with the claim that a linguistic ersatzer who endorses the primitives ‘set’
and ‘sentence’ would maximize the likelihood of limiting the primitives he is
committed to when comparison with a rival account occurs. This is because
the linguistic ersatzer’s two primitives have a good claim to being difficult to
reductively define, meaning that rival definers are likely to accept them as
primitives anyway. §4 consisted of the provision of such a reductive, linguis-
tic ersatzer account. This account was argued to be non-circular due to its
defining ‘possible world’ in terms of maximal-consistent sets of sentences.
It was also argued to be materially-adequate due to the introduction of
assumption-relative accessibility relations that appropriately constrain the
accessible worlds. It was concluded that the arguments from §2 and §3 pro-
vided adequate motivation to adopt this reductive account. Then, in §5,
attempts were made to extend the account to accommodate metaphysical
modal claims. It was discovered that this could only be achieved by postu-
lating an essentialist predicate that appeared in the assumption-sets of such
claims. In §6, it was argued that this essentialist predicate is not a covert
modal term, and that it should instead be endorsed as a primitive. However,
this has an interesting consequence: endorsing the third primitive ‘essential’
no longer renders it likely that the advocate of this account will (compara-
tively) commit herself to fewer primitives than a rival. In fact, it turns out
that the advocate of this account (comparatively) commits herself to the
exact same number of primitives as the modal primitivist who gives a re-
ductive modal definition of ‘essential’ ! The main motivation for this account
qua reductive account is therefore undercut. Nevertheless, the achievement
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of certain goals set out in the introduction should not go unremarked upon.
The first aim was to provide an account of the meanings and truth-
values of metaphysical modal claims within an account of non-metaphysical
modal claims. This target has been met, since the exact same machinery
of maximal-consistent sets of sentences and assumption-relative modal op-
erators is utilised for all flavours of modality. Secondly, I aimed to develop
an approach that reflects the process by which speakers make and assess
metaphysical modal claims. I believe that the notion of assumption-relative
modal operators reflects the techniques employed in formal semantics to
handle non-metaphysical modal claims. I also spent much of §7 suggesting
ways to adapt the account to better represent everyday modal discourse,
including: extending the account to natural language modal claims, allow-
ing metaphysicians’ experiences of modal discourse to influence aspects of
the theory, accommodating contextualist and relativist perspectives of the
selection of assumption-sets, speculating about the constraints that are im-
posed on the sorts of things that may be assumed and clarifying a means
to convert possible worlds to more tractable partial worlds. The third aim
was to produce an account that was as flexible as possible, to allow it to
be adapted to reflect diverse perspectives. The topics on which my account
remains neutral include: the absolute boundaries of the space of possible
worlds (though my preference is to draw them broadly, so as to consider
logical possibilities to be legitimate possibilities); the presence of the essen-
tialist predicate E in the modal predicate language (though my preference is
for absence); the existence and content of a privileged set of assumptions for
metaphysical modal claims (my preference is to deny the existence of such
an assumption-set); the context at which an assumption-set is selected to
constrain the interpretation of a modal claim (my preference is for flexible
relativism); and the breadth of assumptions operative in the consideration
of a particular modal claim (my preference is to keep the assumptions nar-
row and allow some bizarre worlds to be accessible, though eliminable if one
considers only partial worlds). There are a few points of inflexibility, such
as the endorsement of a constant domain semantics.
Despite these merits of the account, and the fact that the recommenda-
tions of the limiting primitives principle have been successfully followed, the
limiting primitives principle does not provide objective motivation to adopt
it over a primitivist account of modality. Nevertheless, a subjective moti-
vation, for those who do not find modal terms to be plausible primitives,
remains. For such individuals, it is hoped that this account of the meanings
and truth-values of metaphysical modal claims will be of some use.
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